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THE RE-EMERGENCE OF INDIGENOUS RIGHTS IN
INTERNATIONAL lAW
Half a millennium ago the peoples indigenous to the continents now called
North and South America began to experience change, a kind of change they
had not experienced before. Europeans arrived and began to lay claim to
their lands, frequently slaughtering the native children, women and men who
stood in the way. For many of those who survived, the Europeans brought
disease and slavery.
1
Not long after the genocidal patterns began, concerned European theolo-
gians and jurists questioned the legality and morality of the onslaught.2 What
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Iowa; J.D. 1983, Harvard Law School; B.A.
1980, University of New Mexico. The author thanks William Buss, Robert Clinton and Bums
Veston for their helpful comments on previous drafts of this article. The author is also grateful
to Rodolfo Santa Cruz and Terry Henry for their research assistance.
1. The devastation of the early European contact has been extensively documented. See,
for example, Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier 36-46 (1987), and sources cited therein.
For a Native American person's perspective, see Dee Brown, Bury My Heart at Wounded Knee
(1970).
The sixteenth century Spanish theologian Bartolome de las Casas wrote of early genocidal
acts against the American natives roughly contemporaneously with their occurrence. He
described events in 1523 when the "tyrant" Pedro Arias de Avila or Pedrarias
went into Nicaragua to subjugate that most flourishing province and a sorrowful
hour it was when he entered that land. Who could exaggerate the felicity, the
good health, the amenities of that prosperous and numerous population? Verily
it was a joy to behold that admirable province with its big towns, some of them
extending three or four leagues, full of gardens and orchards and prosperous
people .... And since these Indians were by nature very gentle and peace-loving,
the tyrant and his comrades (all of whom had aided him in destroying other
kingdoms) inflicted such damage, carried out such slaughters, took so many
captives, perpetrated so many unjust acts that no human tongue could describe
them. He once sent fifty horsemen with pikes to destroy an entire province. Not
a single human being survived that massacre, neither women nor children nor
aged and infirm. And that province was larger than the county of Rusellon in
Spain.
Bartolome de las Casas, The Devastation of the Indies (1530s), in The Central America Crisis
Reader The Essential Guide to the Most Controversial Foreign Policy Issue Today 51 (Robert
S. Leiken & Barry Ruben eds., 1987).
2. See generally S. James Anaya, The Rights of Indigenous Peoples and International Law
in Historical and Contemporary Perspective, 1989 Harv. Indian L. Symp. 191, 193-97 (sum-
marizing the views of the early theorists).
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emerged from their lectures and writings were prescriptions designed to
shape encounters with the peoples of the "New World". The dominant
sixteenth century juridical view was expressed by the Spanish Dominican
Francisco de Vitoria who, applying natural law precepts, challenged the
Spanish claims to native lands.3 Vitoria argued that the Indians of the
Americas were the true owners of their lands, with "dominion in both public
and private matters,"4 and upon this premise he set forth the rules by which
the Europeans could validly acquire Indian lands or assert authority over
them.5 To be sure, the rules were grounded in a European theocratic value
system.6  But significantly, within the limitations of that value system,
Vitoria essentially treated the Indians as having the same rights and duties as
all of humanity.
7
Vitoria's lectures on the Indians established him among the oft-cited
founders of modem international law.8 His prescriptions for the European
encounters with the aboriginal peoples of the Western Hemisphere were
building blocks for a system of principles and rules governing encounters
among all peoples of the world.9 Conversely, subsequent theorists continued
through the nineteenth century to include non-European aboriginal peoples
as among the subjects of what came to be known as the "law of nations"
10
and later "international law".
11
3. Francisco de Vitoria, On the Indians Lately Discovered (1532),published in Franciscus
de Victoria, De Indis et de Ivre Belli Relectiones (Classics of International Law ed. 1917)
(translation based on Boyer ed. 1557, Mufioz ed. 1565 & Simon ed. 1696) (using the Latin
version of his name, "Franciscus de Victoria").
4. Id. at 127-28.
5. According to Vitoria, under the Roman jus gentium, the Indians were bound to allow
foreigners to travel to their lands, trade among them and preach the gospel; failure to adhere to
these rules could lead to "just" war and conquest. Id. at 151-56.
6. For a critical discussion of Vitoria and his application of the Romanjus gentium to the
American Indians, see Robert A. Williams, Jr., The Medieval and Renaissance Origins of the
Status of the American Indian in Western Legal Thought, 57 S. Cal. L. Rev. 1, 76-85 (1983).
7. See Felix Cohen, The Spanish Origin of Indian Rights in the Law of the United States,
31 Geo. L.J. 1, 11-12 (1942) (identifying human equality as a theme of Vitoria's work).
8. See, e.g., Arthur Nussbaum, A Concise History of the Law of Nations 84-93 (1983);
Myres S. McDougal et al., Theories About International Jurisprudence: A Prologue to a
Configurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188, 219-24 (1968).
9. See Nussbaum, supra note 8, at 81-82. Vitoria's influence on later theorists is evident
in the work of Hugo Grotius, the most prominent architect of modem international law. See
generally Hugo Grotius, The Freedom of the Seas (Camegie Endowment for International Peace
ed. 1916) (Elziver ed. 1633).
10. See, e.g., Emmerich de Vattel, The Law of Nations or the Principles of Natural Law
38, 115-16 (II1 Classics of International Law ed. 1916) (1758) (criticizing "[tjhose European
States which attacked the American Nations and subjected them to their avaricious rule ....).
11. See, e.g., Henry Wheaton, Elements of International Law 49-51 (8th ed. 1866)
(discussing the "political relation of the Indian nations on this continent toward the United
States"). Mark Janis credits Jeremy Bentham for coining the term "international law". Mark
W. Janis, An Introduction to International Law 1 (1988) (citing Jeremy Bentham, An Introduc-
tion to the Principles of Morals and Legislation 296 (H. Bums & H.L.A. Hart eds., 1970)).
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Whatever protections the Europeans' law of nations afforded the non-
Europeans, however, they were not enough to stop the forces of colonization
and empire as they extended throughout the globe. Theorists eventually
modified the law of nations to reflect, and hence legitimize, a state of affairs
that consisted in the subjugation of indigenous peoples. Forgetting the
origins of the discipline, theorists described the law of nations, or interna-
tional law, as concerning itself only with the rights and duties of European
and similarly "civilized" states and as having its source entirely in the
positive, consensual acts of those states. 12 Vitoria's admonishments con-
ceming the American Indians were recast as statements of morality as
opposed to law; international law moved to embrace what the "civilized"
states had done, and what they had done was to invade foreign lands and
peoples and assert sovereignty over them.
13
Since the human suffering of the first and second world wars, international
law again has shifted but this time in retreat from the orientation in which
theorists divorced law from morality and denied international rights to all but
states. International law now contains among its constitutional elements
precepts based on visions of a peaceful world order and the concept of human
rights.14 These precepts nourish a powerful discourse that promotes stand-
ards of behavior through the prescriptive articulation of expectations and
values of the human constituents of the world community, not by mere
assessments of state conduct as in the positivist tradition. The United
Nations, other modem international organizations and enhanced communi-
cations provide institutional support for the discourse.15 Under the rubric of
human rights, particularly, it focuses directly on the welfare of individuals
and, increasingly, of groups and hence extends the competency of interna-
tional law beyond concern for relations among states only.
12. See, e.g., John Westlake, Chapters on the Principles of International Law 136-38,
141-45 (1894); William E. Hall, A Treatise on International Law 47-49 (8th ed. 1924); Lassa
Francis Lawrence Oppenheim, International Law 134-35 (3d ed. 1920). Fora description of the
positivist school, see Harold Damerow, A Critical Analysis of the Foundations of International
Law 76-81 (1978). See also James L. Brierly, The Law of Nations 51 (6th ed. 1963).
13. Westlake, for example, characterized Vitoria as one of "the worthy predecessors of
those who now make among us the honorable claim to be 'friends of the aborigines'." Westlake,
supra note 12, at 136-38. The rights of indigenous peoples were thus taken out of the realm of
international concern and were "left to the conscience of the state within whose recognized
territorial sovereignty they are comprised." Id. at 137-38.
14. See generally Bums H. Weston, et al., International Law and World Order. A Prob-
lem-Oriented Coursebook (2d ed. 1990); C. Wilfred Jenks, The Common Law of Mankind
(1958); Wolfgang Friedmann, The Changing Structure of International Law (1964); W. Michael
Reisman, Sovereignty and Human Rights in Contemporary International Law, 84 Am. J. Int'l
L. 866 (1990).
15. See generally Human Rights in the World Community: Issues and Action (Richard P.
Claude & Bums H. Weston eds., 1989); New Directions in Human Rights (Ellen L. Lutz et al.
eds., 1989); Vernon Van Dyke, Human Rights, Ethnicity, and Discrimination (1985).
Arizona Journal of International and Comparative Law [Vol. 8, No. 2
The modem discourse of peace and human rights is reminiscent of the
classical era of naturalist jurisprudence in which law was determined on the
basis of what ought to be rather than simply on the basis of what is. Much
as the classical naturalist framework was invoked by Vitoria and others to
address the rights of native peoples in the face of encroaching societies, the
modem discourse of human rights is the vehicle by which international law
has come to revisit the topic.
Within the last several years, concern for groups identified as indigenous
has assumed a prominent place on the international human rights agenda.
The conceptual category of indigenous peoples or populations has emerged
within the human rights organs of international organizations and other
venues of international discourse. 16 The category is generally understood to
include not only the native tribes of the American continents but also other
culturally distinctive non-state groupings, such as the Australian aboriginal
communities and tribal peoples of southern Asia, that similarly are threatened
by the legacies of colonialism.
17
The subject groups are themselves largely responsible for the mobilization
of the international human rights program in their favor. During the 1970s,
indigenous peoples organized and extended their efforts internationally to
secure legal protection for their continued survival as distinct communities
16. A watershed in contemporary international concern over indigenous peoples was the
1971 resolution by the United Nations Economic and Social Council ("ECOSOC") authorizing
a study on the conditions of indigenous populations. E.S.C. Res. 1589(L), U.N. ESCOR (May
21, 1971). The study, which was issued originally as a series of partial reports from 1981 to
1983, is in U.N. Sub-Comm'n on the Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Study of the Problem of Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
F/CN.4/Sub.2/1986f7 & Adds.1-4 (1986). The original documents comprising the study are, in
order of publication: U.N. Docs E/CN.4/Sub.2/476/Adds.1-6 (1981);
EICN.4/Sub.2/1982/2Adds.1-7 (1982); and E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983121/Adds.1-7 (1983) [hereinaf-
ter U.N. Indigenous Study].
For background on international developments concerning indigenous peoples, see Russel
L. Barsh, Indigenous Peoples: An Emerging Object ofInternational Law, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 369
(1986); Hurst Hannum, New Developments in Indigenous Rights, 28 Va. J. Int'l L. 649 (1988);
National Lawyers Guild, Rethinking Indian Law 129-77 (1982).
17. The U.N. Indigenous Study contains the following definition:
Indigenous communities, peoples and nations are those which, having a historical
continuity with pre-invasion and pre-colonial societies that developed on their
territories, considered themselves distinct from other sectors of the societies now
prevailing in those territories, or parts of them. They form at present non-domi-
nant sectors of society and are determined to preserve, develop and transmit to
future generations their ancestral territories, and their ethnic identity, as the basis
of their continued existence as peoples, in accordance with their own cultural
patterns, social institutions and legal systems.
U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 16, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/AddA, para. 379 (1986).
For a description of discussion among government representatives and international experts
about the concept of "indigenousness", see Barsh, supra note 16, at 373-76.
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with historically based cultures, political institutions and entitlement to
land.18
Indigenous groups and supportive international non-governmental or-
ganizations (NGOs) linked their concerns with general human rights notions
in appeals to international bodies. 19 These efforts coalesced into a veritable
international campaign, aided by an increase of supportive scholarly writings
from moral and sociological, as well as juridical, perspectives.
20
Through the international human rights program, indigenous peoples and
their supporters have been successful in moving states and other relevant
actors to an ever closer accommodation of their demands. The traditional
doctrine of state sovereignty, with its corollaries of territorial integrity,
exclusive jurisdiction and non-intervention in domestic affairs, has hobbled
the capacity of the international legal order to affirm indigenous peoples'
rights and to limit accordingly the action of states within their asserted
spheres of control. Nonetheless, the movement toward ever greater interna-
tional affirmation of indigenous rights, notwithstanding the traditional
bounds of sovereignty, is apparent. Moreover, while the movement can be
expected to continue as indigenous peoples continue to press their cause,
there has already emerged a new constellation of international norms specifi-
cally concerned with indigenous peoples.
The recently adopted International Labour Organization Convention on
Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, Convention No. 169 of 1989,21 is to date the
most concrete manifestation at the international level of the growing respon-
siveness to indigenous peoples' demands. Part II of this article discusses
Convention No. 169 and argues that the Convention is at least partially
18. Among the major developments were several international conferences attended by
indigenous peoples' representatives, including the 1977 International Non-Governmental Or-
ganization Conference on Discrimination Against Indigenous Populations in the Americas, held
in Geneva. Indigenous peoples' representatives at the conference drafted and circulated a draft
Declaration of Principles for the Defence of the Indigenous Nations and Peoples of the Western
Hemisphere. The Declaration, reprinted in National Lawyer's Guild, Rethinking Indian Law,
supra note 16, at 137-38, became an early bench mark for indigenous peoples demands upon
the international community. See also infra note 44 (referring to later indigenous peoples' draft
declarations).
19. A number of indigenous peoples' organizations enhanced their access to the United
Nations human rights machinery by achieving official consultative status with the U.N.
ECOSOC, the parent body of the U.N.'s Human Rights Organs. These organizations today
include the Consejo Indio de Sud-America (CISA), Four Directions Council, Grand Council of
the Crees (of Quebec), Indian Law Resource Center, Indigenous World Association, Interna-
tional Indian Treaty Council, International Organization of Indigenous Resources Development,
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services Secretariat,
National Indian Youth Council and World Council of Indigenous Peoples.
20. See generally Kelly Roy & Gudmundur Alfredsson, Indigenous Rights: The Literature
Explosion, 13 Transnat'l Persp. 19 (1987).
21. Convention (No. 169): Convention Concerning Indigenous and Tribal Peoples in
Independent Countries, June 27, 1989, International Labour Conference (reprinted elsewhere in
this issue-Eds.) (entered into force Sept. 5, 1990) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 169].
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expressive of new norms of customary international law, norms generated
by patterns of communicative behavior involving states and international
organizations. The existence of customary norms concerning indigenous
peoples is significant in that customary norms are generally binding upon the
constituent units of the world community regardless of any formal act of
assent to the norms.
After part II, the article synthesizes general human rights principles,
relevant international practice, and ILO Convention No. 169 to discern
further the existence, content and normative underpinnings of an emergent
body of international indigenous rights law. Hence, part Ill identifies a
general human rights norm of cultural integrity and discusses its development
in favor of indigenous peoples. Part IV examines new indigenous land rights
norms, particularly as they are articulated in Convention No. 169, and
identifies them as corollaries of the norm of cultural integrity and also of
generally accepted property precepts. Finally, part V discusses the long-
standing human rights principle of self-determination and links it with
Convention No. 169 and relevant international practice to discern a new
self-determination norm specifically concerned with indigenous peoples.
II. INTERNATIONAL LABOUR ORGANIZATION
CONVENTION NO. 169
The new ILO Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples represents a
marked departure in world community policy from the philosophy underly-
ing the only previously existing international instrument expressly address-
ing the topic: ILO Convention No. 107 of 1957.22 Adopted at a time when
the dominant political elements in domestic and international circles placed
little or no value on indigenous cultures, 23 Convention No. 107 presumed a
norm of assimilation.2 4 Except for its land rights provisions, Convention No.
22. Convention (No. 107): Convention Concerning the Protection and Integration of
Indigenous and other Tribal and Semi-Tribal Populations in Independent Countries, June 26,
1957, International Labour Conference, (reprinted elsewhere in this issue-Eds.) 328 U.N.T.S.
247 (entered into force June 2, 1959) [hereinafter ILO Convention No. 107].
23. The adoption of ILO Convention No. 107, for example, corresponds to the "termina-
tion" period in the United States during which federal policy was to promote the assimilation of
Indian cultures by terminating federal recognition of their tribal status.
24. The thrust of ILO Convention No. 107 is reflected in article 2, under which: "Govern-
ments shall have the primary responsibility for developing co-ordinated and systematic action
for the protection of the populations concerned and their progressive integration into the life of
their respective countries." For a critical view of ILO Convention No. 107, see Douglas Sanders,
The Re-Emergence of Indigenous Questions in International Law, 1983 Can. Hum. Rts. Y.B. 3,
19-20. For an assessment of ILO Convention No. 107 from within the ILO see Lee Swepston
& Roger Plant, International Standards and the Protection ofthe LandRights of Indigenous and
Tribal Populations, 124 Int'l Lab. Rev. 91 (1985).
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107 came to be regarded as a dinosaur325 Accordingly, in 1986, the ILO
convened a "meeting of experts" which recommended that the Convention
be revised.26 The meeting unanimously concluded that the "integrationist
language" of Convention No. 107 is "outdated" and "destructive in the
modem world." 27 The discussion on the revision proceeded at the 1988
and 1989 sessions of the International Labour Conference, the highest
decision-making body of the ILO. At the close of the 1989 session, the
Conference adopted the new Convention No. 169 and its shift from the prior
philosophical stand.28 As of February 1992, four states had already
ratified the Convention (Norway, Mexico, Colombia and Bolivia), and
ILO officials reported that several other ratifications were expected in the
near future.29
Convention No. 169 carries the basic theme of the right of indigenous
peoples to live and develop by their own designs as distinct communities.
30
The Convention has extensive provisions advancing indigenous cultural
integrity, 31 land and resource rights,32 and non-discrimination in social
welfare spheres; 33 in addition, it generally enjoins states to respect indige-
nous peoples' aspirations in all decisions affecting them.34 Indigenous rights
advocates have expressed dissatisfaction with language in Convention No.
169, viewing it as not sufficiently constraining of government conduct in
25. See Howard R. Berman, The International Organization and Indigenous Peoples:
Revision of I.L.O. Convention No. 107at the 75th Session of the InternationalLabor Conference,
1988,41 Int'l Comm'n Jurists Rev. 48, 49 (1988) (designating Convention No. 107 as "dead
letter").
26. Report of the Meeting of the Experts, reprinted in part in ILO: Partial Revision of
Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), Report VI(1), International
Labour Conference, 75th Sess. 100-18 (1988).
27. Id. para. 46.
28. For detailed descriptions of ILO Convention No. 169 and the process leading to it, see
Lee Swepston, A New Step in the International Law on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples: ILO
Convention No. 169 of 1989, 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev. 677 (1990); Russel L. Barsh, An
Advocate's Guide to the Convention on Indigenous and Tribal Peoples, 15 Okla. City U. L. Rev.
209 (1990).
29. The ILO has reported that among the countries indicating favorable dispositions toward
prompt ratification are the following: Guatamala, Brazil, Venezuela, Chile and Russia. Tele-
phone Interview with Lee Swepston, Legal Officer, ILO (Feb. 1992).
30. This theme is apparent in the Preamble to the Convention which recognizes "the
aspirations of [indigenous] peoples to exercise control over their own institutions, ways of life
and economic development and to maintain and develop their identities, languages and religions,
within the framework of the states in which they live." ILO Convention No. 169, supra note
21, preambular para. 5.
31. See infra notes 82-92 and accompanying text.
32. See infra notes 101-14 and accompanying text.
33. See ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, part III (Recruitment and Conditions of
Employment), part IV (Vocational Training, Handicrafts and Rural Industries), part V (Social
Security and Health), part VI (Education and Means of Communication).
34. See infra notes 150-56 and accompanying text.
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relation to indigenous peoples' concerns. 35 Indeed, the Convention "con-
tains few absolute rules but fixes goals, priorities and minimum rights."
36
But whatever its shortcomings, the Convention succeeds in aff-mning the
value of indigenous communities and cultures and in setting forth a series of
basic precepts in that regard.
In addition to creating treaty obligations among ratifying states, Conven-
tion No. 169 is properly viewed as reflecting a new and still developing body
of customary international law. Customary norms arise-or to use the now
much favored term "crystallize"--when a preponderance of states and other
authoritative actors converge upon a common understanding of the norms'
content and generally expect future behavior in conformity with the norms.
37
The traditional points of reference for determining the existence of a custom-
ary norm are patterns of communicative behavior involving physical episodic
conduct. 38 Under traditional analysis, the content of the emergent rule and
35. Representatives of indigenous peoples' organizations expressed such dissatisfaction to
the International Labour Conference ("ILC") upon completion of the drafting ofILO Convention
No. 169. See International Labour Conference, Provisional Record 31,76th Sess., at 31/6 (1989)
[hereinafter 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31] (statement of Sharon Venne, representative of
the International Work Group for Indigenous Affairs speaking on behalf of indigenous peoples
from North and South America, the Nordic countries, Japan, Australia and Greenland); see also
id. at 31/7 (statement of Ontiveros Yulquila, representative of the Indian Council of South
America). Since the Convention was adopted at the 1989 Labour Conference, however,
indigenous peoples' organizations and their representatives increasingly have expressed support
for ratification. Among the organizations now favoring ratification are the Nordic Sami
Conference, the Inuit Circumpolar Conference, the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, and
the National Indian Youth Council.
36. Swepston, supra note 28, at 689. Several of the provisions of the ILO Convention No.
169 contain caveats or appear in the form of recommendations. See, e.g., art. 8.1 ("In applying
national laws and regulations to the peoples concerned, due regard shall be had to their customs
or customary laws ...."); art. 9.1 ("To the extent compatible with the national legal system and
internationally recogni[z]ed human rights, the methods customarily practi[c]ed by the peoples
concerned for dealing with offen[s]es committed by their members shall be respected."); art.
10.1 ("In imposing penalties laid down by general law on members of these peoples account
shall be taken of their economic, social and cultural characteristics.") (emphasis supplied). ILO
Convention No. 169, supra note 21.
37. Professors McDougal, Lasswell and Chen describe customary law as "generally
observed to include two key elements: a 'material' element in certain past uniformities in behavior
and a 'psychological' element, or opiniojuris, in certain subjectivities of'oughtness' attending such
uniformities in behavior." Myers S. MeDougal et al., Human Rights and World Public Order 269
(1980) (footnote omitted). Compare the Statute of the International Court of Justice, article
38(1)(b), describing "international custom, as evidence of a general practice accepted as law."
38. Such episodic conduct is illustrated by Professor D'Amato thusly:
[A] courier of State X delivers an unwelcome message to the king of State Y. The
king imprisons the messenger. State X responds by sending another courier
(obviously a reluctant one) who delivers the message that unless Y returns the
first courier safe and sound X will sack and destroy the towns of Y. If Y releases
the first courier with an apology and perhaps a payment of gold, a resolution of
the issue in this matter will lead to a rule that official couriers are entitled to
immunity against imprisonment.
Anthony D'Amato, The Concept of Human Rights in International Law, 82 Colum. L. Rev.
1110,1130 (1982).
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the required subjectivities of normative expectation (the so-called opinio
juris) are inferred from the episodic conduct.
Today, however, interactive patterns around concrete events are no longer
considered the only-or even necessarily required-material elements con-
stitutive of customary norms. With the advent of modem international
intergovernmental institutions and enhanced communications media, states
and other relevant actors increasingly engage in dialogue to come to terms
on international standards. 39 It is now understood that express communica-
tion, whether or'not in association with concrete events, is a form of practice
that builds customary rules, and that communication may itself bring about
a convergence of understanding and expectation about rules even in advance
of a widespread corresponding pattern of physical conduct.4° Of course,
conforming conduct will strengthen emergent customary rules by enhancing
attendant subjectivities of expectation.41
ILO Convention No. 169 embodies a convergence of normative under-
standing and expectation, which under the theory just sketched, is constitu-
39. See McDougal et al., supra note 37, at 272 ("[I]t is easily observable that such
organizations, especially the United Nations and affiliated agencies, play an increasingly
important role as forums for the flow of explicit communications and acts of collaboration which
create peoples' expectations about authoritative community policy.").
40. See id. at 272-73; Bin Cheng, United Nations Resolutions on Outer Space: Instant
International Customary Law?, 5 Indian J. Int'l L. 45 (1965) (stating that the common belief of
states that they are bound to a rule is the "only one single constitutive element" and that
conforming actual conduct merely provides evidence of the rule's existence.); H.W.A. Thirlway,
International Customary Law and Codification 56 (1972) ("The opinio necessitatis in the early
stages is sufficient to create a rule of law, but its continued existence is dependent on subsequent
practice accompanied by opiniojuris, failing which the new-born rule will prove a sickly infant,
and fail to survive for long."). Accordingly, Professor Brownlie defines the "material sources
of custom" to include: "diplomatic correspondence, policy statements, press releases,...
comments by governments on drafts produced by the International Law Commission .... recitals
in treaties and other international instruments, a pattern of treaties in the same form, the practice
of international organs, and resolutions relating to legal questions in the United Nations General
Assembly." Ian Brownlie, Principles of Public International Law 5 (4th ed. 1990). See also
Michael Akehurst, CustomasaSourceoflnternationalLaw, 1974-75 Brit. Y.B. Int'l L. 1, 15-16;
Tunkin, Theory of International Law 114-15 (1970) (Butler trans. 1974); Theodor Meron,
Human Rights and Humanitarian Norms as Customary Law 41 (1989).
Professor D'Amato holds that when two or more states conclude a treaty setting forth
generally applicable norms, the treaty-making act itself generates customary international law.
D'Amato supra note 38, at 1130-35. Professor Sohn further observes that government practice
in negotiating the text of a normative treaty may generate customary law even in advance of
signature or ratification: "[Tihe Court is thus willing to pay attention not only to a text that
codifies preexisting principles of international law but also to one that crystallizes an 'emergent
rule of customary law."' Louis B. Sohn, "Generally Accepted" International Rules, 61 Wash.
L. Rev. 1073, 1077 (1986) (citing Continental Shelf Case (Tunisia/Libyan Arab Jamahiriya),
1982 I.C.J. 18, 38); see also Louis B. Sohn, Unratified Treaties as a Source of Customary
International Law, in Realism in Lawmaking: Essays on International Law in Honor of Willem
Riphagan 231 (A. Bos and H. Siblesz eds., 1986).
41. See generally Joseph Gabriel Starke, Introduction to International Law 38-39 (10th ed.
1989) (describing how the recurrence of a usage develops opinio juris, that is "an expectation
that, in similar future situations, the same conduct or the abstention therefrom will be repeated.").
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five of customary law. The process leading to the adoption of the Convention
was part of a larger effort to identify and promote indigenous rights that had
been going on for some time within international human rights bodies,
particularly within the United Nations Working Group on Indigenous Popu-
lations ("Working Group"). Established in 1982, the Working Group is an
organ of the U.N. Sub-Commission on Prevention of Discrimination and
Protection of Minorities ("Sub-Commission") with a mandate to review
developments concerning indigenous peoples rights and to work toward the
evolution of corresponding international standards.42 In 1985 its standard-
setting mandate was refined when the Sub-Commission approved the
Group's decision to draft a declaration on the rights of indigenous peoples
for adoption by the U.N. General Assembly.
43
The Working Group itself is composed of five rotating members of the
Sub-Commission who act in the capacity of experts rather than government
representatives. Through its activities, however, the Working Group has
engaged states, indigenous peoples and others in an extended multilateral
dialogue on indigenous rights.44 The Working Group has provided a forum
for indigenous representatives to articulate concerns and assert rights, which
they have done in part by promoting their own written declarations of rights. 4
5
42. U.N. Human Rights Comm'n Res. 1982/19 (1982); E.S.C. Res. 1982/34, U.N. ESCOR
(1982).
43. Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Res.
1985/22 (1985) [hereinafter 1985 Sub-Comm'n Res.]. In 1988 the Working Group chair
produced the Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights, which appears in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4Sub.2/1988125 (1988). After comments by government and indigenous peoples' repre-
sentatives, the chair revised the draft in 1989. See Report of the Working Group on Indigenous
Populations on its Seventh Session, 16, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1989/36 (1989) [hereinafter
1989 Working Group Report] (including, in Annex II, the First Revised Text of the Draft
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples). The first revised text of the draft
was published originally in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/198933 (1989). Discussion continued on
language for the declaration at the Working Group's 1990 and 1991 sessions. See Report of the
Working Group on Indigenous Populations on its Eighth Session, U.N. Doc
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1990/42 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Working Group Report]; Report of the Working
Group on Indigenous Populations on its Ninth Session, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/40 (199 1)
[hereinafter 1991 Working Group Report] (including, in Annex I, additional revisions of the
draft agreed upon by the members of the Working Group).
44. The Working Group is unique in all the U.N. System in its practice of allowing anybody
to speak at public Working Group meetings. In other U.N. meetings open to individuals other
than government representatives, participation is limited to designated experts, special invitees
or representatives of non-governmental organizations with recognized consultative status with
the Economic and Social Council. See generally Chiang Pei-Heng, Nongovernmental Organi-
zations at the United Nations: Identity, Role, and Function (1981).
45. E.g., Declaration of Principles adopted at the Fourth General Assembly of the World
Council of Indigenous Peoples in Panama, Sept. 1984, reprinted in Report of the Working Group
on Indigenous Populations on its Fourth Session, Annex III, U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2/1985/22
(1985); Draft Declaration of Principles proposed by Indian Law Resource Center, Four Direc-
tions Council, National Aboriginal and Islander Legal Services, National Indian Youth Council,
Inuit Circumpolar Conference, and International Indian Treaty Council, reprinted in id. at Annex
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Government representatives have joined in the discourse with their own
pronouncements on the content of indigenous rights.46 Virtually every State
of the American continents has participated in the discussion. Canada, with
its large indigenous population, has taken a leading role. States of other
regions with significant indigenous populations also have been active, espe-
cially Australia and New Zealand. The Philippines, Bangladesh and India
are just a few of the other numerous states that have made regular oral or
written submissions to the Working Group.47
Most all of the states that have been active in the U.N. Working Group
meetings also took on visible roles in the committee of the International
Labour Conference that drafted Convention No. 169. The United States,
although having minimally participated in the Working Group's activity,
notably contributed to the ILO process. 48 Representatives of a total of
thirty-nine governments participated in the Conference committee, in addi-
tion to the worker and employee delegates that are part of the "tripartite"
system of governance in the 1LO. 9 The ILO treaty revision process accel-
erated the international discussion of indigenous rights by focusing it on the
adoption of a normative instrument within a fairly short time frame.
The text of the Convention was approved by the committee by consensus
50
and adopted by the full Conference by an overwhelming majority of the
voting delegates.5 1 None of the government delegates voted against adoption
of the text, although a number abstained.52 Government delegates who
abstained, however, expressed concern primarily about the wording of
certain provisions or about perceived ambiguities in the text, while in many
IV; see also proposed universal declarations on indigenous rights by the Assembly of First
Nations (Canada) and by the World Council of Indigenous Peoples, reprinted in U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.411989/5 (1989).
46. For a description and commentary of the Working Group processes, see Robert A.
Williams, Jr., Encounters on the Frontiers of International Human Rights Law: Redefining the
Terms of lndigenous Peoples' Survival in the World, 1990 Duke LJ. 660, 676-82.
47. A listing of the participants at the Working Group meetings and a summary of the
discussion is included in the reports that correspond to each of the annual Working Group
sessions. See, e.g., 1989 Working Group Report, supra note 43; 1990 Working Group Report,
supra note 43; 1991 Working Group Report, supra note 43.
48. See generally the government statements summarized in the following: International
Labour Conference, Provisional Record 32,75th Sess. (1988) [hereinafter 1988 ILO Provisional
Record 32]; International Labour Conference, Provisional Record 25, 76th Sess. (1989) [here-
inafter 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25].
49. See 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/1 n.1. For a description of
thelLO's system of governance, see David Bowett, TheLaw of International Institutions 140-43
(4th ed. 1982); Nicholas Valticos, International Labor Law (1979).
50. 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/24 to 25125.
51. The vote was 328 in favor, I against, with 49 abstentions. The opposing vote was cast
by the employer delegate from the Netherlands. International Labour Conference, Provisional
Record 32,76th Sess., at 32/17 to 32/19 (1989) [hereinafter 1989 ILO Provisional Record 32].
52. Among the delegates recording votes in favor of the Convention were representatives
of the governments of 92 states; the government delegations of 20 states recorded abstentions.
Id.
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instances indicating support for the core precepts of the new Convention.53
No government recorded outright rejection of the essential principles repre-
sented in the text.54 Since the Convention was adopted in 1989, government
53. Peru's statement is typical of the views expressed by the abstaining governments:
Given the importance of this subject for Peru, our delegation participated
actively in the revision of Convention No. 107 with a view to updating the text
and improving it on a multilateral basis to promote the rights of indigenous and
native populations and to guarantee these rights in the various countries. We also
wished to ensure that within the international community these populations
would be able to develop fully and transmit their cultural heritage.
In my country, there is very progressive legislation along these lines and I must
highlight the fact that most of the criteria laid down in the new Convention are
already contained in our legal instruments. However, the work which has taken
place within this tripartite forum-at an international level-has been of consid-
erable significance and receives our full support.
In this context, after the prolonged negotiations which led to a consensus text,
our delation nevertheless felt bound to express reservations with respect to the
use in the Convention of some terms which could lead to ambiguous interpreta-
tions and create difficulties with our laws in force, on some points of the highest
importance. These reservations are laid down in paragraph 156 of the report of
the Committee....
Id. at 32/12. The part of the Committee report cited reflects Peru's concern over the use of the
term "territories" and other language that "might imply the right to deny or accord approval and
thereby lead to concepts of sovereignty outside the Constitution." 1989 ILO Provisional Record
25, supra note 48, at 25/22. See also, e.g., 1989 ILO Provisional Record 32, supra note 51, at
32/12 (statement of the government delegate of Argentina concurring in the "pluralistic view of
the new Convention" and endorsing "national legislation which recognizes the cultural and
social identity of indigenous peoples and the granting of land" to them, while at the same time
expressing difficulty with use of the term "peoples" to refer to the subject groups and with the
inclusion of the words "consent" and "agreement" in article 6, paragraph 2). On use of the terms
"territories", "peoples" and the wording of article 6, see, respectively, infra notes 120 and
accompanying text, note 146, and note 153. Government expressions of dissatisfaction with the
text were directed-especially at its land rights provisions. See, e.g., 1989 ILO Provisional Record
No. 25, supra note 48, at 25/16 to 25/23 (summarizing statements of the governments of
Argentina, Brazil, Japan, Peru, and Venezuela). Government attitudes toward the land rights
norms expressed in Convention No. 169 are discussed infra notes 115-21, and accompanying
text. Several of the abstaining governments indicated support for the Convention's basic thrust
by reporting on domestic initiatives generally consistent with the Convention. See infra note 59
and accompanying text.
54. But see the Venezuelan adviser's statement in 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31, supra
note 35, at 31/16, that Venezuela "has serious difficulties with the text submitted... [which]
includes concepts by their nature and scope [that] are in conflict with standards contained in the
Venezuelan national Constitution and with some specific provisions of our legislation on the
subject. Our government will examine the text carefully and constructively." Similarly, in
statements to the U.N. Working Group, Venezuela has appeared reluctant to embrace norms
concerning indigenous peoples beyond prescriptions of nondiscrimination. See, e.g., U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.21AC.4/1990/1, at 13 (1990) (information received from Government of Vene-
zuela). Venezuela's public statements to international bodies, however, do not fully reflect that
country's position or compulsion regarding indigenous peoples' rights. For example, in the
summer of 1991 the Venezuelan president signed a decree "that reserves a stretch of Amazon
forest the size of Maine as a permanent homeland for the country's 14,000 Yanomami Indians."
James Brooke, Venezuela Befriends Tribe, But What's Venezuela?, N.Y. Times, Sept. 11, 1991,
at A4.
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comments directed at developing a universal indigenous rights declaration
in the U.N. Working Group context generally have affirmed the basic
precepts set forth in the Convention, and indeed the comments indicate an
emerging consensus that even more closely accords with indigenous peoples'
demands.
55
The convergence of international opinion about the content of indigenous
rights implies a convergence of subjectivities of obligation and expectation
attendant upon the rights, regardless of any treaty ratification or other formal
act of assent to the articulated norms. The standard-setting discussion in both
the Working Group and the 1LO has proceeded in response to demands made
by indigenous groups over several years and upon an extensive record of
justification based upon general human rights precepts.
56
The pervasive assumption has been that the articulation of indigenous
rights norms is an exercise in identifying standards of conduct that are
required to uphold widely shared community values of human dignity. The
multilateral processes that build a common understanding of the content of
55. Summaries of government comments delivered orally at the 1989, 1990 and 1991
sessions of the U.N. Working Group appear, respectively, in 1989 Working Group Report, supra
note 43; 1990 Working Group Report, supra note 43; 1991 Working Group Report, supra note
43. Written comments on the proposed declaration appear verbatim or are summarized in
Analytical Compilation of Observations and Comments Received Pursuant to Sub-Comm'n
Resolution 1988/18, U.N. Doe. EICN.4ISub.2/1989/33/Adds.1-3 (1989) [hereinafter 1989
Working Group Analytical Compilation of Observations]; Analytical Commentary on the Draft
Principles Contained in the First Revised Text of the Draft Declaration on the Rights of
Indigenous Peoples, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/39 (1990) [hereinafter 1990 Working
Group Analytical Commentary]; Draft Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples-Re-
vised Working Paper Submitted by the Chairperson/Rapporteur Erica-Irene Daes, pursuant to
Sub-Comm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities Resolution 1990/26,
U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1991/36 (1991) [hereinafter 1991 Revised Working Paper]; U.N.
Docs. EJCN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/1, Corr.1 & Adds.1-3 (1990) (information received from
governments of Argentina, Australia, Brazil, Canada, China, Finland, Papua New Guinea and
Venezuela); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.21AC.4/1991/1 (1991) (information received from govern-
ments of Mexico and Finland). Movement toward greater affirmation of indigenous rights is
especially apparent within the normative category of self-determination, discussed infra at
nn.124-66.
56. See supra notes 16-21 and accompanying text. The multivoluminous UN. Indigenous
Study, supra note 16, includes extensive recommendations and conclusions generally supportive
of indigenous peoples' demands from a human rights perspective. The conclusions and
recommendations are in Volume V of the study, U.N. Doe. E/CN.4ISub.2/1986flAddA. The
institutional record has been further built upon a series of conferences within the U.N. and
Inter-American systems. In 1981, for example, the United Nations Educational Scientific and
Cultural Organization convened in Costa Rica for the Conference of Specialists on Ethnocide
and Ethnodevelopment in Latin America. The Conference adopted the San Jose Declaration
affirming the "inalienable right of Indian groups" to consolidate their cultural identity and to
"exercise . . . self-determination." U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 16, at U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/21/Add.3 para. 25 (1983). Additionally, the Inter-American Indian Institute
of the Organization of American States has organized a number of periodic conferences, the last
one being in Buenas Aires, Argentina in 1989. See generally Russel L. Barsh, The IX Inter-
American Indian Congress, 80 Am. J. Int'l L. 682 (1986).
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indigenous rights, therefore, also build expectations that the rights will be
upheld.
57
Especially probative of the existence of customary indigenous rights
norms are government statements in the ILO and Working Group processes
about relevant domestic policies and initiatives. Because the reports of
domestic developments have been made to international audiences con-
cemed with promoting indigenous peoples' rights, they provide a strong
indication of what governments consider their corresponding obligations to
be, notwithstanding difficulties in agreeing on normative language for inclu-
sion in written texts. Several governments made statements on domestic
developments during the negotiation of Convention No. 169 and upon its
submission for a record vote.58 The statements reflect a clear trend of
programmatic reforms generally in line with the Convention, even among
states whose governments abstained from voting in favor its adoption.
59
57. Moreover, such subjectivities of expectation are of a legal and notjust moral character.
Traditionally, there has been a distinction between subjectivities of moral as opposed to legal
obligation or expectation, with only the latter qualifying as opinio juris, the essential psycho-
logical component of customary law. The distinction between moral and legal obligation is a
product of positivist thinking that prevailed in international legal discourse at the turn of the
century. See supra note 12 and accompanying text. Under such thinking, it was possible for a
state to violate widely shared norms of human dignity while not committing an affront to
international law. However, as noted at the outset of this article, contemporary international
law includes among its constitutional elements the moral precepts of peace and human rights.
The U.N. Charter and the constituent texts of the major regional intergovernmental organiza-
tions, along with decades of transnational normative activity, have firmly established an
obligation to uphold human rights as a matter of general international law. See supra note 56.
The consequent demise of the traditional distinction between moral and legal obligation is evident
in contemporary jurisprudential studies. For Miguel D'Estefano, state practice builds customary
law where it is a response to "an idea ofjustice and humanity." Miguel A. D'Estefano, I Esquemas
del Derecho Intemacional Publico (Primera Pane) 13 (1986) (translation from Spanish is the
writer's). Professor Meron finds opinio juris in a subjective belief that a practice follows from
"compelling principles of humanity." Meron, supra note 40, at 53. Professors McDougal, Lasswcll
and Chen hold that "subjectivities of oughtness [opiniojuris] required to attend.., uniformities of
behavior may relate to many different systems of norms, such as prior authority, natural law, reason,
morality, or religion." McDougal et al., supra note 37, at 269. See also Brownlie, supra note 40,
at 28 (discussing considerations of humanity that may function as a source of law).
58. For example, see government statements made to the Conference committee that
drafted ILO Convention No. 169, summarized in 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note
48, at 25/2 to 25/3; see also 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31, supra note 35, at 31/12 to 31/17
(containing government statements to the plenary of the Labour Conference upon the Conven-
tion's submission for a vote); 1989 TLO Provisional Record 32, supra note 5 1, at 32/11 to 32/12.
59. See 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/2: "Several Government
members referred to recent enactments of legislation.., and noted that their legislation went
beyond the provisions contained in the proposed Convention." See also 1989 ILO Provisional
Record 32, supra note 51. Among the abstaining governments that reported on such domestic
developments were the governments of Bangladesh, Brazil, Argentina and Peru. Id. at 32/11 to
32/12. The government delegate from Bangiadesh, for example, even while expressing reserva-
tions about the need to revise the ILO Convention, reported on "recent legislation passed by the
parliament with a view to further strengthening the rights of tribal peoples and the machinery to
enable them to manage their own affairs and preserve their own socio-cultural heritage and
separate identity." Id.
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The government practice of reporting on domestic policies and initiatives
has been a regular feature of the Working Group's activity under its mandate
"to review developments pertaining to the promotion and protection of
indigenous populations."' 6 Over the life of the Working Group, more and
more states have entered its discussion of developments, affirming the pattern
of responsiveness to indigenous peoples' demands.61 In their written and
oral statements to the Working Group, governments have continued to
characterize their conduct in ways that comport with, and in many cases
surpass, the norms expressed in the ILO Convention. 62 Such statements add
to the evidence of customary indigenous rights law which includes the
essential aspects of Convention No. 169. The remainder of this article
elaborates upon the emergent customary and conventional norms of indige-
nous rights, while establishing their grounding in previously accepted human
rights precepts.
m. CULTURAL INTEGRITY
The new body of international law concerning indigenous peoples inter-
sects with and in significant part extends from a generally applicable human
60. 1985 Sub-Comm'n Res., supra note 43.
61. See discussions of "Review of Developments Pertaining to the Promotion and Protec-
tion of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms of Indigenous Populations" which appear in
the the 1982, 1983, 1984, 1985, 1987, 1988, 1989, 1990 and 1991 reports of the U.N. Working
Group, which respectively are in U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1982/33 (1982); U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/1983/22 (1983); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1984/20 (1984); U.N. Doc.
E[CN.4fSub.2/1985/22 (1985); U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.211987/22 (1987); U.N. Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/1988/24 (1988); 1989 Working Group Report, supra note 43, 1990 Working
Group Report, supra note 43, 1991 Working Group Report, supra note 43; see also various
government statements read orally at the Working Group sessions, discussed infra beginning at
note 90. Written government submissions on domestic developments appear, inter alia, in U.N.
Doc. E/CN.41Sub.21AC.4/1989/2 & Add.1 (1989) (information received from Australia, Brazil,
Canada and Venezuela); U.N. Doc. EICN.4/Sub.2AC.4/1990/4 (1990) (information received
from Bangladesh): U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1991/4 (1991) (information received from
Colombia) [hereinafter 1991 Information submitted by Colombia].
62. The report of the 1991 session of the Working Group states:
Several Governments reported that their countries had experienced political
changes and indigenous peoples have benefitted from the new constitutional
reforms and enactment of legislation. Indigenous representatives participated in
the drafting process or were consulted. As some indigenous representatives
stated, even at this stage, new laws are being proposed or have been adopted
which recognize the right to self-determination of indigenous peoples and their
right to land, acknowledge the jurisdiction of indigenous peoples in their own
territories, suggest mechanisms for dealing with the settlement of land claims,
and recognize the right to education and health care.
1991 Working Group Report supra note 43, at 12.
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rights norm of cultural integrity.63 The notion of respect for cultural particu-
larism has been a feature of treaties among European powers since the Peace
of Westphalia in 1648.64 The Anti-Genocide Convention, the first U.N.
sponsored human rights treaty, upholds that all cultural groupings have, at a
minimum, a right to exist. 65 Respect for cultures beyond those of European
derivation is promoted further by article 27 of the International Covenant on
Civil and Political Rights. 66 Article 27 affirms in universalist terms the right
of persons belonging to "ethnic, linguistic or religious minorities ... to enjoy
their own culture, to profess and practice their own religion [and] to use their
own language."
67
63. Rights of cultural integrity outside the specific context of indigenous peoples have
developed internationally mostly under the rubric of"minority rights". An extensive survey of
the topic is in U.N. Subcomm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of Minorities,
Study on the Rights of Persons Belonging to Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic Minorities,
E/CN.4/sub.2/384/Rev.1 (1979) Sales No. E.78.XIV.1 (Francesco Capotorti, special rap-
porteur). See also Patrick Thomberry, International Law and the Rights of Minorities (1991).
Indigenous rights advocates frequently have rejected denominating indigenous groups as
"minorities" in attempts at establishing indigenous peoples within a separate normative regime
with greater rights. For example, in a communication to the U.N. Human Rights Committee
concerning the Mikmaq of Canada, Decision of the Human Rights Committee under the Optional
Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, U.N. GAOR, 39th Sess.,
Supp. No. 40, at 202, U.N. Doe. A/39/40 (1984), the author of the communication asserted that
the "Mikmaq tribal society" was not a "minority" but rather a "people" within the meaning of
article I of International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 52, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Mar.
23, 1976). Article 1 holds that "[a]ll peoples have the rights to self-determination." (The
Committee dismissed the communication on procedural grounds).
Although without endorsing such formalistic distinctions, U.N. practice has been to treat
indigenous groups as within a category apart from the more general category of minorities.
While there is a U.N. Working Group on Indigenous Populations, there is also a U.N. Working
Group on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National, Ethnic, Religious and Linguistic
Minorities. And the Minority Rights Working Group is engaged in a parallel effort to develop
a U.N. declaration. See Draft Declaration on the Rights of Persons Belonging to National or
Ethnic, Religious or Linguistic Minorities, U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/1989/38, Annex I at 11 (1989).
It is apparent that indigenous peoples are considered to have distinguishing concerns and
characteristics that warrant separate treatment. Nonetheless, as Professor Brownlie observes,
the normative bases for addressing indigenous peoples' concerns and the concerns of the more
general category of minorities have much in common. Ian Brownlie, The Rights of Peoples in
Modern International Law, in The Rights of Peoples 1, 5-6 (Crawford ed. 1988).
64. See Natan Lerner, Group Rights and Discrimination in International Law 7 (1991)
(listing Westphalian and other pre-World War I European treaties with provisions protecting
the rights of religious and ethnic minorities). See also the Convention for the Protection of
Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, Nov. 4, 1950, art. 14, Europ. 213 U.N.T.S. 221
(entered into force Sept. 3, 1953) (prohibiting discrimination on the grounds of "language,
religion .... [and] association with a national minority.").
65. Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide, Dec. 9, 1948,
78 U.N.T.S. 277,280 (entered into force Jan. 12, 1951) (defining, at article II, genocide as "acts
committed with intent to destroy, in whole or in part, a national, ethnical, racial or religious
group as such... .
66. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63, art. 27.
67. Id.
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Affirmation of the world's diverse cultures was the central concern of a
resolution by the Fourteenth General Conference of the United Nations
Education, Scientific and Cultural Organization (UNESCO). The 1966
UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation
proclaims in its first article:
1. Each culture has a dignity and value which must be respected and
preserved.
2. Every people has the right and duty to develop its culture.
3. In their rich variety and diversity, and in the reciprocal influence they
exert on one another, all cultures form part of the common heritage
belonging to all mankind.
68
Both article 27 of the Covenant and the UNESCO Declaration are framed
by preambular language as extending from the human rights principles of the
United Nations Charter.69 A number of other human rights instruments also
have provisions upholding rights of cultural integrity.70
The cultural integrity norm, particularly as embodied in article 27, has
been the basis of decisions favorable to indigenous peoples by the U.N.
Human Rights Committee and the Inter-American Commission on Human
Rights of the Organization of American States. Both bodies have held the
norm to cover all aspects of an indigenous group's survival as a distinct
culture, understanding culture to include economic or political institutions,
land use patterns, as well as language and religious practices. The norm is
also held to require states to act affirmatively to protect the cultural matrix
of indigenous groups and not simply to refrain from coercing assimilation or
abandonment of cultural practices. The Inter-American Commission, fur-
thermore, has treated the norm as generally binding upon states regardless of
any specific treaty obligation.
68. 1966 UNESCO Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation,
14th Sess., Nov. 4, 1966, ar. 1, reprinted in United Nations, Human Rights: A Compilation of
International Instruments at 409, U.N. Doe. ST/HR/I/rev.3, U.N. Sales No. E. 88.XLV.1 (1988).
69. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63, pream-
bular para. 4 ("[clonsidering the obligation of States under the Charter of the United Nations to
promote universal respect for, and observance of, human rights and freedoms"); 1966 UNESCO
Declaration of the Principles of International Cultural Cooperation, supra note 68, para. 9
(proclaiming the declaration "to the end that governments, authorities, [etc.] ... may constantly
be guided by these principles; and for the purpose... of advancing.., the objectives of peace
and welfare that are defined of the charter of the United Nations.").
70. See, e.g., 1960 UNESCO Convention on Combatting Discrimination in Education,
Dec. 14, 1960, art. 5 (entered into force May 22, 1962) (recognizing "the right of all members
of national minorities to carry out educational activities of their own, among them that of
establishing and maintaining schools, and according to the policy of each state on education, to
use their own language."). Recently, the cultural rights of ethnic minorities have been the subject
of renewed focus by the Conference on Security and Co-Operation in Europe. See Hurst
Hannum, Contemporary Developments in the International Protection of the Rights of Ethnic
Minorities, 66 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1431, 1439-43 (1991).
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In its 1985 decision concerning the Yanomami of Brazil,7" the Commis-
sion invoked article 27 in favor of the Indians even though Brazil is not a
party to the International Covenant on Civil and Political rights. Citing the
article, the Commission held that "international law in its present state...
recognizes the right of ethnic groups to special protection on the use of their
own language, for the practice of their own religion, and, in general, for all
those characteristics necessary for the preservation of their cultural iden-
tity. ' '72 In this vein, the Commission stressed that "the Organization of
American States has established, as an action of priority for the member
states, the preservation and strengthening of the cultural heritage of [indige-
nous] groups. .. ,73 The Commission viewed a series of incursions into
Yanomami ancestral lands as a threat not only to Yanomami's physical
well-being but also to their culture and traditions. 74 Among the recommen-
dations made by the Commission to protect the cultural heritage of the
Yanomami was that the government proceed to secure the boundaries of a
reserve for the group.
75
The Commission further demonstrated the scope of the cultural integrity
norm in its consideration of a complaint against the government of Nicaragua
concerning the Miskito Indians.76 The Commission found that the "special
legal protection" accorded the Indians for the preservation of their cultural
identity should extend to "the aspects linked to productive organization,
which includes, among other things, the issue of ancestral and communal
lands."77 In response to the Indians' demands for political autonomy, the
71. Res. No. 12/85, Case No. 7615 Inter-Am. C.H.R. 24 (1985) in Annual Report of the
Inter-American Commission on Human Rights 1984-85, OEA/Ser.L/V/l.66, Doe. 10 Rev. 1
(1985).
72. Id. at 31 para. 7.
73. Id. para. 9.
74. Id. at 29-30, para. 2.
75. Id. at 33, para. 3b.
76. OAS Inter-American Comm'n Human Rights,Report on the Situation of Human Rights
of a Segment of the Nicaraguan Population of Miskito Origin and Resolution on the Friendly
Settlement Procedure Regarding the Human Rights Situation of a Segment of the Nicaraguan
Population of Miskito Origin, OEA/Ser. L/V/II.62, doe. 10 rev. 3 (1983), OEA/Ser. L/V/II.62,
doe. 26 (1984) [hereinafter OAS Miskito Indians Report].
77. Id. at 81, para. 15. The Commission noted that the requirement of special measures to
protect indigenous culture is
"based on the principle of equality: for example, if a child is educated in a
language which is not his native language, this can mean that the child is treated
on an equal basis with other children who are educated in their native language.
The protection of minorities, therefore, requires affirmative action to safeguard
the rights of minorities whenever the people in question ... wish to maintain
their distinction of language and culture."
Id. at 77, para. 4 (quoting U.N. Secretary General: The Main Types and Causes of Discrimina-
tion, U.N. Publ. 49.XIV.3 paras. 6-7).
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Commission also found that "the observance of these principles entails the
need to establish an adequate institutional order as part of the structure of the
Nicaraguan state."
78
A similarly extensive view of the cultural integrity norm as applied to
indigenous peoples has been taken by the U.N. Human Rights Committee.
In Ominayak and the Lubicon Lake Band v. Canada79 the Committee
construed the cultural rights guarantees of article 27 to extend to "economic
and social activities" upon which the Lubicon Lake Band relied as a group.
80
Thus the Committee found that Canada had violated article 27 by allowing
the provincial government of Alberta to grant leases for oil and gas explora-
tion and for timber development within the aboriginal territory of the Band.
The Committee acknowledged that the Band's survival as a distinct cultural
community was bound up with the sustenance that it derived from the land.81
Government practice in the U.N. Working Group and in the negotiation
and adoption of the text of ILO Convention No. 169 is in accord with these
interpretations of the norm of cultural integrity, and the practice is probative
of the norm's status as customary law. Ambassador Espafia-Smith of Bo-
livia, the chair of the ILO Conference Committee that drafted Convention
No. 169, summarized the normative consensus reflected in the text:
The proposed Convention takes as its basic premise respect for the
specific characteristics of the differences among indigenous and tribal
peoples and the cultural, social and economic spheres. It consecrates
respect for the integrity of the values, practices and institutions of these
peoples in the general framework of guarantees enabling them to
maintain their own different identities and ensuring self-identification,
78. Id. at 81-82, para. 15.
79. 1990 Annual Report ofthe HumanRights Committee, U.N. Doc. A/45/40, Vol. II, App.
A. (1990) [hereinafter Report of the Human Rights Committee]. The case is discussed and
analyzed in Dominic McGoldrick, Canadian Indians, Cultural Rights and the Human Rights
Committee, 40 Int'l & Camp. L.Q. 658 (1991).
80. Report of the HumanRights Committee, supra note 79, para. 32.2.
81. See also Kitok v. Sweden, in Report of the Human Rights Committee, supra note 79,
para. 9.6. In considering whether reindeer husbandry constituted a cultural activity protected
by article 27 of the Covenant, the Human Rights Committee observed:
The regulation of an economic activity is normally a matter for the State alone.
However, where that activity is an essential element in the culture of an ethnic
community, its application to an individual may fall under Article 27 of the
Covenant... [t]he committee observes, in this context, that the right to enjoy
one's own culture in community with the other members of the group cannot be
determined in abstracto but has to be placed in context.
The Committee, however, ultimately found that the Swedish Reindeer Husbandry Act did not
violate article 27 as to the complainant. The Committee noted that Kitok was allowed under the
Act to graze his reindeer and carry on other subsistence activities, under the act, even if not as
a matter of right. Id. paras. 9.6 to 9.8.
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totally exempt from pressures which might lead to forced assimilation,
but without ruling out the possibility of their integration with other
societies and lifestyles as long as this is freely and voluntarily chosen.
82
The same cultural integrity theme is at the core of the draft indigenous
rights declarations produced by the chair of the U.N. Working Group
pursuant to that body's standard-setting mandate.83  States have joined
indigenous rights advocates in expressing widespread agreement with that
essential thrust even while diverging in their views on particular aspects of
the drafts.84 The preamble to the Working Group chair's first revised draft
declaration is an express elaboration on the norm of cultural integrity as
applied to indigenous peoples. In 1990, the Working Group chair concluded,
on the basis of comments by governments and nongovernmental organiza-
tions, that a consensus supported all but three of the preambular paragraphs.
85
Among the preambular paragraphs for which the Working Group Chair
reported widespread support is the following:
Endorsing calls for the consolidation and strengthening of indigenous
societies and their cultures and traditions through development based
on their own needs and value systems and comprehensive participation
in and consultation about all other relevant development efforts .... 86
The Working Group Chair also reported general agreement among gov-
ernments and NGO's with regard to the following operative provision of the
revised draft:
3. the [collective] right to exist as distinct peoples and to be protected
against genocide....
82. 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31, supra note 35, at 31/4; see also government
statements in 1988 ILO Provisional Record 32, supra note 48, at 32/11 to 32/13.
83. See infra notes 86-87 and accompanying text.
84. See 1989 Working Group Analytical Compilation of Observations, supra note 55.
Australia, for example, "supports the thrust of the draft declaration towards recognition of the
right of indigenous people to be free and equal to all other human beings, to preserve their cultural
identity and traditions, and to pursue their own cultural development." Id. at 2.
Panama holds that the "draft universal declaration on indigenous rights reflects all contem-
porary assumptions regarding indigenous populations and represents genuine recognition of the
rights of those populations to be observed by Govenments and societies." Id. at 8.
Commenting on the first revised draft, Mexico affirmed that it "endorses, on the whole, the
spirit of the draft" and emphasized the importance of clear language affirming the cultural
characteristics and the distinct identity of indigenous peoples. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.21AC.4/1991/1 (1991), supra note 55, at 6.
85. See 1990 Working Group Analytical Commentary, supra note 55, at 3.
86. First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, preambular para. 7, supra note 43 (quoted and discussed in the 1990 Working Group
Analytical Commentary, supra note 55).
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4. the [collective] right to maintain and develop their ethnic and cultural
characteristics and distinct identity, including the right of peoples and
individuals to call themselves by their proper names .... 87
The ILO and Working Group processes, furthermore, confirm that States
are to act affirmatively to protect the enjoyment of indigenous culture.
8
Within these processes states have manifested their assent to a requirement
of affirmative action with particular regard to language, although with some
divergence of views. Indigenous peoples' representatives have advocated
that indigenous peoples be permitted to use their mother tongue in legal
proceedings, and that position has found support among some states.89 Other
states, while demonstrating support for the use of indigenous languages in
legal proceedings and other official contexts, have appeared reluctant to
accede to a strict requirement to that effect.90 The trend, nonetheless, is in
87. Id. operative paras. 3, 4.
88. Thus, article 2(1) of ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, provides: "Governments
shall have responsibility for developing, with the participation of the peoples concerned,
coordinated and systematic action to protect the tights of these peoples and to guarantee respect
for their integrity." Similarly, operative paragraph 7 of the First Revised Text of the Draft
Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous Peoples, supra note 43, specifies: "The right
to require that states grant-within the resources available-the necessary assistance for the
maintenance of their identity and their development." This provision was among those for which
the Working Group Chair reported there is widespread support among governments and NGOs.
1990 Working Group Analytical Commentary, supra note 55, at 3. See also U.N. Indigenous
Study, supra note 16, at U.N.DOc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/I983/211Add.3 para. 12 (1983) ("The fact that
the State has clear positive responsibilities in matters of cultural rights is generally recognized
today.").
89. During the drafting of Convention No. 169, for example, the government delegate from
Ecuador proposed an amendment to allow indigenous peoples to use their languages in legal
proceedings. The delegate from Argentina responded that, although the amendment was
laudable, it was impractical. The amendment was withdrawn. 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25,
supra note 48, at 25/16.
90. Canada, for example, has reported to the U.N. Working Group that it "encourages and
financially supports its aboriginal citizens in maintaining, using and promoting their own
languages and cultures in their own communities, in educating their children, in legal proceed-
ings, etc. However... it would be administratively and financially difficult, if not impossible
to provide for the use of over 50 aboriginal languages for administrative or other official
purposes." U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/l/Add.1 (1990), supra note 55, at 3 (informa-
tion from the Government of Canada). Similarly, the government of New Zealand stated to the
Working Group that it can "fully support" the concept of the right of indigenous peoples to use
their language injudicial administrative proceedings. The government also suggested, however,
that "the principle be couched in terms of being an objective for states to work toward in a
determined and thorough-going manner." 1991 Statement of the Government of New Zealand
to the Working Group (presented by Alastair Bisley, Permanent Representative) (on file with
author) [hereinafter 1991 Statement of the Government of New Zealand to the Working Group].
Previously, the New Zealand government had reported to the Working Group on the Maori
Language Act of 1987 which "declares Maori to be an official language and establishes a
Commission to promote the Maori language as an ordinary means of communication." 1989
Statement of the Government of New Zealand to the Working Group (presented by Graham
Fortune, Permanent Representative) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1989 Statement of the
Government of New Zealand to the Working Group]. See also, Statements of Colombia, Egypt,
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favor of greater efforts to promote and accommodate indigenous languages.
91
Normative expectations converge at least to the extent of an obligation upon
states to provide some affirmative support for the use of indigenous languages
as appropriate to particular circumstances. At a minimum, states must
provide interpretation services or other effective means to ensure that indige-
nous persons can communicate in legal proceedings and other official
contexts. 92
As for religion, states have conceded that the preservation of sacred sites
and guarantees of access to them are among the affirmative measures which
may be required in particular circumstances. Thus, the government of
Australia reported to the U.N. Working Group that it successfully halted the
construction of a dam that would have submerged a number of sacred sites
near Alice Springs.93 The Australian government also reported that it had
stopped a mining project that would have damaged an area of significant
cultural and religious import to the aboriginal Jawoyn people.94 Similarly,
the government of New Zealand reported to the U.N. Working Group on
newly established protection for sites of special religious significance to the
Finland, Mexico, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, United States and Australia in ILO: Partial
Revision of Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107), VI(2), International
Labour Conference, 75th Sess., at 86-88 (1988) [hereinafter ILO Convention (No. 107), Report
VI(2)]; ILO: Partial Revision of Indigenous and Tribal Populations Convention, 1957 (No. 107),
VI(2A), International Labour Conference, 75th Sess., at 29 (1988).
91. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1989/2, at 8 (1989) (information submitted
to the Working Group by the Government of Brazil reporting on the new provisions of the
Brazilian Constitution affirming indigenous language rights); 1991 Statement of the Govern-
ment of Colombia to the Working Group (reporting on the provisions of the new Colombian
Constitution giving the languages of indigenous groups official character and establishing
bilingual education) [hereinafter 1991 Statement of the Government of Colombia to the Working
Group] (on file with author); 1989 Statement of the Government of Norway to the Working
Group (Statement that the Norwegian Parliament "amended the Constitution of 1814 by inserting
a new article stating that it is incumbent on the authorities of the state to create conditions
enabling the Sami people to preserve and develop their own language, culture and social life")
(on file with author) [hereinafter 1989 Statement of the Government of Norway to the Working
Group]; U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/sub.2IAC.4/1991/1, at 3 (1991) (information submitted to the
Working Group by the Government of Finland reporting on recent legislation allowing the use
of the Sami language in courts of law and requiring that official documents relevant to Sami
interests be published in the Sami language).
92. ILO Convention No. 169 provides that "[m]easures shall be taken to insure that
members of [indigenous peoples] can understand and be understood in legal proceedings, where
necessary for the purpose of interpretation or by other effective means." ILO Convention No.
169, supra note 21, art. 12. Argentina goes further suggesting that the proposed Universal
Declaration on Indigenous Rights include: "The right to develop and promote their own
languages, including an [sic] own literary language, and to use them for cultural and other
purposes. In legal and administrative proceedings, when the indigenous person does not know
the national language, the State shall obligatorily provide and/or make available the services of
interpreters .. " 1991 Revised Working Paper, supra note 55, at 57.
93, July 31, 1991 Statement of the Government of Australia to the Working Group, at 8
(presented by MP Robert Tickner, Minister for Aboriginal Affairs) (on file with author)
[hereinafter July 31, 1991 Statement of the Government of Australia to the Working Group].
94. Id.
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indigenous Maori of that country.95
Rights of access to sacred sites, however, are generally not held to be
absolute. Canada, for example, agrees with rights of access to sacred sites
and burial grounds, but stresses the need to balance such rights with compet-
ing claims and interests of non-indigenous groups and the state itself.9 6 In
any case, states clearly are held, and hold themselves, to an increasingly
higher standard of care to ensure indigenous peoples the free exercise of their
religious traditions.
97
Government practice indicates assent to affirmative duties protective of
culture beyond categories of language and religion, commensurate with the
broad interpretation of the cultural integrity norm advanced by the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission and the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee. In statements to the ILO and U.N. Working Group, governments have
reported on domestic initiatives concerning indigenous peoples, including
constitutional and legislative reforms, and have characterized the initiatives
as generally intended to safeguard the integrity and life of indigenous
cultures.98 The reported reforms vary in scope and content, based in part on
the diversity of circumstances and characteristics of the indigenous groups
95. See 1989 Statement of the Government of New Zealand to the Working Group, supra
note 90, at 5. ("All Crown agencies responsible for the management and disposal of Crown.land
must follow a procedure [prior to disposal of any land] in order that wahi tapu [sacred sites] be
protected.!).
96. 1989 Working Group Analytical Compilation of Observations, supra note 55, at 20.
97. The formal policy of the United States, as expressed in the American Indian Religious
Freedom Act of 1978, 42 U.S.C. § 1996, is generally in line with international developments.
The U.S. federal courts, however, have held the Act not to be judicially enforceable thus
facilitating transgressions of the Act's policy of promoting government accommodations for the
exercise of indigenous religion. See, e.g., Lyng v. Northwest Indian Cemetery Protective
Association, 485 U.S. 439 (1988). But the federal courts have not ruled on the application of the
modem international norm requiring protection for the enjoyment of indigenous culture,
including religious practices. For authority on the use of international rules in United States
courts, see infra notes 167-69.
98. Representatives of the following governments reported on such domestic initiatives:
New Zealand, Brazil, U.S.S.R., United States, Mexico and Honduras. These reports are
summarized in 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/2 to 25/4 paras. 9-14. The
governments of Bangladesh, India, Argentina and Peru reported on similar initiatives to the
plenary session of the 1989 ILC upon submission of the revised convention for a record vote.
1989 ILO Provisional Record No. 32, supra note 51, at 32/11 to 32/12.
Additional domestic initiatives reflective of the norm of cultural survival and flourishment
have recently been reported to the U.N. Working Group. Among these are constitutional reforms
in Colombia, 1991 Statement of the Government of Colombia to the Working Group, supra note
91; executive level initiatives, as well as legislative and constitutional reforms in Canada,
characterized as efforts to preserve "the special place of our first citizens", 1991 Statement of
the Government of Canada to the Working Group (presented by Gerald E. Shannon, Ambassador
and Permanent Representative) (on file with author) [hereinafter 1991 Statement of the Govern-
ment of Canada to the Working Group]; proposed framework legislation in Australia that would set
in motion a series of efforts to further the aspirations of the aboriginal peoples, July 31, 1991
Statement of the Government of Australia to the Working Group, supra note 93; and the implemen-
tation of government policy characterized as responsive to the demands of the Maori people of New
Zealand, 1991 Statement of the Government of New Zealand to the Working Group, supra note 90.
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concerned. The Maori people of New Zealand, for example, who live
throughout that country and have developed pervasive linkages with the
majority population in many spheres of life, are properly regarded as having
requirements different from those of the isolated forest dwelling tribes of
Brazil. 99 Government representatives have been quick to point out the
diversity among indigenous groups throughout efforts to articulate prescrip-
tions protective of indigenous rights.1°° That diversity, however, does not
undermine the strength of the cultural integrity norm as much as it leads to
an understanding that the norm requires diverse applications in diverse
settings. In all cases, the operative premise is that of securing the survival
and flourishing of indigenous cultures.
IV. LAND AND NATURAL RESOURCES RIGHTS
The Inter-American Human Rights Commission and the U.N. Human
Rights Committee in the cases previously mentioned specifically acknow-
ledge the importance of lands and resources to the survival of indigenous
cultures.10 1 That understanding is a widely accepted tenet of contemporary
international concern over indigenous peoples.I12 It follows from indigenous
peoples' articulated ideas of communal stewardship over land and a deeply
felt spiritual and emotional nexus with the earth and its fruits.
10 3
99. For information on the situation of the Maori people of New Zealand as compared to
the conditions of the forest dwelling tribes of Brazil, see, respectively, Andrew Sharp, Justice
and the Maori: Maori Claims in New Zealand Political Argument in the 1980s (1990); Alex
Shoumatoff, The Rivers Amazon 39-54 (1978).
100. See, e.g., U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/I, Add.3 (1990), supra note 55, at 1-2
(information submitted by Government of Canada); July 29, 1991 Statement of the Government
of New Zealand to the Working Group, supra note 90, at 2.
101. See supra notes 71-81 and accompanying text; see also Laurie Reynolds, Indian
Hunting and Fishing Rights: the Role of Tribal Sovereignty and Preemption, 62 N.C. L. Rev.
743, 743 (1984) ("Historically, the land and its resources have played a central role in tribal life.
Hunting and fishing, aside from satisfying basic need of subsistence, often have provided the
tribe with a source of income and have played an important part in religious and ceremonial
aspects of the tribal life.").
102. See U.N. Indigenous Study, supra note 16, at U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/1986/7/Add.4.
It must be understood that, for indigenous populations, land does not represent
simply a possession or means of production.... It is also essential to understand
the special and profoundly spiritual relationship of indigenous peoples with
Mother Earth as basic to their existence and to all their beliefs, customs,
traditions and culture.
Id. at 39.
103. For a compilation of indigenous people's statements about the land and its meaning,
see Touch the Earth: A Self Portrait of Indian Existence (T.C. McLuhan ed., 1971); see also
Thomas R. Berger, Village Journey: The Report of the Alaska Native Review Commission
(1985) (documenting the testimony of Alaska Natives concerning their feelings about the lands
and resources that traditionally have sustained them); Julian Burger, Report from the Frontier The
State of the World's Indigenous Peoples 13-16 (1987) (on indigenous "Land and Philosophy").
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Property concepts add to the normative underpinnings of indigenous land
and resource rights. The idea of property is a long established feature
common to societies throughout the world. The conceptof property includes
the notion that human beings have rights to lands and chattels that they by
some measure of legitimacy have reduced to their control.' 4 Legal systems
vary in prescribing the rules by which the rights are acquired and in defining
the rights. The most commonly noted dichotomy is between the system of
private property rights in Western societies and classical Marxist systems in
which the state retains formal ownership of all real estate and natural
resources while granting rights of use.105 The common feature, however, is
that people do acquire and retain rights of a proprietary nature in relation to
other people, and respect for those rights is valued.
Property has been affirmed as an international human right. Article 17 of
the Universal Declaration of Human Rights states that "[e]veryone has the
right to own property alone as well as in association with others" and that
"[n]o one shall be arbitrarily deprived of his property."' 0 6 These norms are
repeated in article 21 of the American Convention on Human Rights. 10 7
Early intemational jurisprudence invoked property precepts to affirm that
indigenous peoples in the Americas and elsewhere had original rights to the
lands they used and occupied prior to contact with the encroaching white
societies.1 08 That jurisprudence made its way into the legal and political
doctrine of some of the countries that were born of colonial patterns, most
notably the United States.1 9 That doctrine, however, developed without
104. See generally Rene David & John Briefly, Major Legal Systems in the World Today
269-73 (2d ed. 1978) (containing a comparative discussion of "ownership" in the Soviet legal
system); Lawrence Friedman, The Law of the Living, the Law ofthe Dead: Property, Succession,
and Society, 1966 Wis. L. Rev. 340 (succession of the interests in the American legal system).
105. The following literature reflects many of the dimensions of this dichotomy: Edward
J. Epstein, The Theoretical System of Property Rights in China's General Principles of Civil
Law: Theoretical Controversy in the Drafting Process and Beyond, 52 Law & Contemp. Probs.
177 (1989); Randy Bregman & Dorothy C. Lawrence, New Developments in Soviet Property
Law, 28 Colum. J. Transnat'l L. 189 (1990); Symposium, Property: The Founding, the Welfare
State, and Beyond-The Eighth Annual National Federalist Society Symposium on Law and
Public Policy 1989, 13 Harv. J.L. & Pub. Pol'y 1 (1990).
106. Universal Declaration of Human Rights, G.A. Res. 217A (MI), U.N. Doe. A/810, at
71(1948).
107. American Convention on Human Rights, Nov. 22, 1969, O.A.S. Official Records,
OEA/Ser.K/XVI/1.I., Doec. 65, rev. 1, corr. 1 (1970) (entered into force Jul. 18, 1978).
108. A common theme of the classical theorists of international law (1500s through early
1700s) was that non-European aboriginal peoples had territorial and autonomy rights which the
Europeans were bound to respect. See Vitoria, supra note 3 (arguing that the Indians of the
Americas were the true owners of their lands, with dominion in both public and private matters);
Hugo Grotius, The Law of War and Peace 550 (Francis W. Kelsey et al. trans., Classics of
International Law ed. 1925) (1646) (rejecting title by discovery "even though the occupant may
be wicked, may hold wrong views about God, or may dull of wit. For discovery applies to those
things which belong to no one."); Vattell, supra note 10.
109. See Worcesterv. Georgia, 31 U.S. (6 Pet.) 515,559-60 (1832) (drawing upon the "law
of nations" to affirm the "original natural rights" of Indians to their lands); United States As
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valuing indigenous cultures or the significance of their ongoing relationship
with land. Thus the United States, while upholding original rights to lands,
has traditionally treated Indian lands as fungible with cash.' 10
In contemporary international law, by contrast, modem notions of cultural
integrity join property precepts in the affirmation of indigenous land and
resource rights, as evident in ILO Convention No. 169. The principal land
rights provisions of the Convention are arts. 13 and 14:
Article 13
1. In applying the provisions of this Part of the Convention govern-
ments shall respect the special importance for the cultures and spiritual
values of the peoples concerned of their relationship with the lands or
territories, or both as applicable, which they occupy or otherwise use,
and in particular the collective aspects of this relationship.
2. The use of the term "lands" in Articles 15 and 16 shall include the
concept of territories, which covers the total environment of the areas
which the peoples concerned occupy or otherwise use.
Article 14
1. The rights of ownership and possession of the peoples concerned
over the lands which they traditionally occupy shall be recognized. In
addition, measures shall be taken in appropriate cases to safeguard the
right of the peoples concerned to use lands not exclusively occupied
by them, but to which they have traditionally had access for their
subsistence and traditional activities. Particular attention shall be paid
to the situation of nomadic peoples and shifting cultivators in this
respect.
2. Governments shall take steps as necessary to identify the lands which
the peoples concerned traditionally occupy, and to guarantee effective
protection of their rights of ownership and possession.
3. Adequate procedures shall be established within the national legal
system to resolve land claims by the peoples concerned.
Guardians of the Hualpai Indians of Ariz. v. Santa Fe Pac. R.R. Co., 314 U.S. 339 (1942)
(affirming that aboriginal title exists until Congress by clear and unambiguous action authorizes
its extinguishment); see generally Felix Cohen, Original Indian Title, 32 Minn. L. Rev. 28
(1947).
110. See S.James AnayaNative Land Claims in the United States: The UnatonedforSpirit
of Place, in The 1991 Cambridge Lectures (F. McArdle ed., forthcoming 1992) (discussing the
Indian Claims Commission Act of 1946 by which the United States sought to comprehensively
address Indian land claims through monetary settlements to the exclusion of the restoration of
occupancy rights).
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Article 15, furthermore, specifies the right "to participate in the use, man-
agement and conservation" of the natural resources pertaining to their lands.
The Convention also states that indigenous peoples "shall not be removed
from the lands which they occupy" unless under prescribed conditions and
where necessary as an "exceptional measure".111 When the grounds for
relocation no longer exist, they "shall have the right to return to their
traditional lands" and when return is not possible "these peoples shall be
provided in all cases with lands of quality and legal status at least equal to
that of the lands previously occupied by them."' 112 The Convention addition-
ally provides for recognition of indigenous land tenure systems.
113
Thus Convention No. 169 affirms the norm recognized by the Inter-
American Human Rights Commission and the U.N. Human Rights Commit-
tee that indigenous peoples are entitled to a continuing relationship with lands
and natural resources according to traditional patterns of use or occupancy.
Use of the words "traditionally occupy" in article 14(1), as opposed to use
of the past tense of the verb, suggests that the occupancy must be connected
with the present in order for it to give rise to possessory rights. In light of
the article 13 requirement of respect for cultural values related to land, a
sufficient present connection with lost lands may be established by a con-
tinuing cultural attachment to them, particularly if dispossession occurred
recently. Also relevant in this regard is paragraph 3 of article 14 which
mandates the establishment of land claims procedures. This provision is
without any temporal limitation and thus empowers claims originating well
in the past, including those that might today rest primarily on concepts of
property.
114
The essential aspects of Convention No. 169's land rights provisions are
strongly rooted in a broad nexus of international opinion and practice. In
responding to a questionnaire circulated by the International Labour Office
in preparation for the drafting of the new Convention, governments over-
whelmingly favored strengthening the land rights provisions of ILO Conven-
tion No. 107 of 1957, including governments not parties to that
Convention."15 Although Convention No. 107 is generally regarded as
flawed, it contains a recognition of indigenous land rights that has operated
in favor of indigenous peoples' demands through the ILO's supervisory
111. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, art. 16.
112. Id. art. 16(3)-(4).
113. Id. art. 17.
114. A concurring analysis of the land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 from the
perspective of the primary International Labour Office official involved in developing the
Convention is in Swepston, supra note 28, at 696-710 (1990).
115. Responses to the land rights part of the questionnaire are summarized and analyzed
in ILO Convention (No. 107), Report VI(2), supra note 90, at 45-64.
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machinery. 16 The discussion on the new Convention proceeded on the
premise that indigenous peoples were to be accorded recognition of land
rights in excess of those specified in Convention No. 107.117
The land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 were finalized by a
special working party of the Labour Conference Committee that-developed
the text of the Convention, and the Committee approved the provisions by
consensus.118 Several governments, however, commented on the provisions
and expressed concerns over their wording, although not with their basic
content.1 19 Particularly problematic was use of the term "territories" in
article 13(2) because some governments believed the term might have
open-ended implications of sovereignty for indigenous-peoples in derogation
of the sovereignty of the state.120 But no exception was taken to the specific
meaning attached to the term in the text. Several governments, moreover,
reported on domestic measures that generally were in conformity with the
adopted land rights provisions.121
Government statements to the U.N. Working Group confirm general
acceptance of at least the core aspects of the land rights norms expressed in
Convention No. 169. Government statements tell of worldwide initiatives
to secure indigenous possessory and use rights over land and to redress
116. Recently, for example, the ILO Committee of Experts on the Application of Conven-
tions and Recommendations and the Conference Committee on the Application of Standards
have been influential in resolving problems concerning the land and territorial rights of tribal
peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts of Bangladesh and in addressing land rights, as well as
basic human rights concerns of the Yanomami of Brazil. See Note by Intemational Labour
Office to the Working Group on Indigenous Populations, U.N. Doc.
E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1991/6, at 2 (1991); ILO, Report of the Committee of Experts on the
Application of Conventions and Recommendations, I1(4A), 78th Sess., at 349-51 (1991). For
a description of the ILO's supervisory machinery, see generally Nicholas Valticos, International
Labor Law, Part II (1979).
117. Although the drafting of the land rights provisions of Convention No. 169 was
controversial, the controversy was mostly a result of efforts by indigenous peoples' repre-
sentatives, worker delegates and some governments to attain specification of greater land and
resource rights than those ultimately included in the Convention. See Swepston, supra note 28,
at 696-98.
118. 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/21.
119. Id. at 2521 to 25/23.
120. See, e.g., id. at 25/22 (summary of the statement of Peru); see also, id. at 25/18 to
25/20 (summary of discussion prior to adoption of the consensus text). Several states also
expressed difficulty with the use of the term "ownership" in article 14 to describe the character
of the land rights recognized. See id. at 25/1 to 25/23. There was no objection, however, to the
idea of secure rights of possession and occupancy in lands. Id. Thus, for example, Brazil, while
expressing concern about article 14, stressed that its new Constitution "recogni[z]ed the
permanent possession of traditionally occupied lands by indigenous and tribal peoples." Id. at
25/21.
121. See, e.g., 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/19 (Brazil) and 25/22
(Colombia); 1989 ILO Provisional Record 31, supra note 35, at 31/13 (Norway, on behalf of itself,
Finland, Sweden and Denmark); 1989 ILO Provisional Record 32, supra note 51, at 32/11
(India).
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historical claims.122 And discussions over language for the indigenous rights
declaration include efforts to build on the already recognized rights.123 It
appears most probable that indigenous land rights norms, rooted in otherwise
accepted precepts of property and cultural integrity, have made their way not
just into international conventional law but also into customary law.
V. SELF-DETERMINATION
An additional and overriding normative category of international human
rights law that extends in favor of indigenous peoples' demands is the
principle or right of self-determination. The term "self-determination"
gained prominence in international political discourse around World War I
and served as a prescriptive vehicle for the re-division of Europe in the wake
of the downfall of the German, Austro-Hungarian and Ottoman empires.
124
World War II gave rise to the United Nations, and "self-determination of
peoples" was included in the U.N. Charter as among the foundational
principles to which the organization's members commit themselves. 125 The
International Human Rights Covenants hold out self-determination as a
"right" of "[aIll peoples" 126 as does the African Charter on Human and
Peoples Rights.' 27  Beyond its textual affirmation, self-determination is
widely held to be a norm of general or customary international law, and
122. See, e.g., 1991 Statement of the Government of Colombia to the Working Group,
supra note 91; 1991 Information submitted by Colombia, supra note 61; 1991 Statement of the
Government of Canada to the Working Group, supra note 98, at 2-3; July 31, 1991 Statement
of the Government of Australia to the Working Group, supra note 93, at 6-8; 1989 Statement of
the Government of Brazil to the Working Group under Item 5 at 2 (on file with author); U.N.
Doc. E/CN.4ISub.2AC.4/1989/2, at 7-8 (1989) (information received from government of
Brazil); 1989 Statement of the Government of the Philippines to the Working Group at 1-2 (on
file with author) [hereinafter 1989 Statement of the Government of the Philippines to the
Working Group].
123. See 1990Working Group Analytical Commentary, supra note 55, at 10-15 (discussing
commentary by government and indigenous observers on the land rights provisions of the First
Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on Indigenous Rights).
124. See Umozurike Oji Umozurike, Self-Determination in International Law 11-12
(1971). "The word 'self-determination' is derived from the German word selbstbestimmungs-
recht and was frequently used by German radical philosophers in the middle of the 19th century."
Id. at 3.
125. U.N. Charter art. 1, para. 2.
126. International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, supra note 63, art. 2(1); Inter-
national Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights, Dec. 16, 1966, G.A. Res. 2200
(XXI), 21 U.N. GAOR Supp. No. 16, at 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1967) (entered into force Jan.
3, 1976).
127. African Charter on Human and Peoples Rights, June, 27 1981, OAU Doc. CAB,
LEG/67/3 rev. 5 (entered into force Oct. 21, 1986).
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arguablyjus cogens (a peremptory norm). 128 Theoretical conceptions about
the precise contours of the norm vary.129 It is possible, however, to identify
a core of widely held conviction in international legal discourse about the
self-determination concept. That core consists of the idea that human beings,
individually and as groups, should be in control of their own destiny and that
structures of government should be devised accordingly. 130 The self-deter-
mination idea promoted the downfall of colonial structures by which people
were considered to be under "alien subjugation, domination and exploita-
tion." 131 Today, the idea promotes the abolition of apartheid in South
128. See, e.g., U.N. Sub-Comnm'n on Prevention of Discrimination and Protection of
Minorities, The Right of Self-Determination: Historical and Current Developments on the Basis
of United Nations Instruments, at 23, U.N. Doc. EICN.4ISub.2404/Rev.1 (1981) (Auerliu
Cristescu, Special Rapporteur) [hereinafter U.N. Study on Self-Determination]; Hurst Hannum,
Autonomy, Sovereignty and Self-Determination 45 (1990); Thomberry, supra note 63, at 14;
Brownlie, supra note 40, at 597; Malcolm Shaw, Title to Territory in Africa 89 (1988).
129. See generally W. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, The Principle of Self-Determination in Interna-
tional Law 1-69 (1977) (categorizing and describing three major schools of thought concerning
self-determination); Lee C. Buchheit, Secession: The Legitimacy of Self-Determination 127-37
(1978) (analyzing divergent views on the asserted right of "secessionist self-determination");
Umozorike, supra note 124, at 177-203 (searching for the "content of self-determination");
Nathanial Berman, Self-Determination in International Law: Self-Sovereignty in Abeyance, 7
Wis. J. Int'l L. 51 (1989) (discussing self-determination as a form of legal argument).
The fact that the specific contours of the principle of self-determination remain elusive has
not discouraged scholars from affirming its legal character. Ofuatey-Kodjoe responds to the
skeptics by quoting Hirsch Lauterpacht:
"although it may be admitted that the effective implementation of a rule is
somewhat reduced by the lack of precision, there is no logical reason to say that
the rule, therefore, does not exist, for, the existence of a rule of law, strictly
speaking, is independent of the exactness of its definition."
Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra, at 8 (quoting H. Lauterpacht, International Law and Human Rights
148-49 (1950)).
130. See Lung-chu Chen, An Introduction to Contemporary International Law 31 (1989)
("The demand for self-determination is an important dimension of the demand for freedom in
our world."). Even while diverging in setting forth normative prescriptions concerning the
principle or right of self-determination, scholarly writing concerning the concept commonly
associates it with the American or French revolutions and an underlying sentiment associated
with the terms "government by consent", "popular sovereignty" or "democracy". See, e.g.,
Umozurike, supra note 124, at 3-11; Bucheit, supra note 129, at 1-42; A. Rigo-Sureda, The
Evolution of the Right of Self-Determination: A Study of United Nations Practice 17-25 (1973);
D. Ronen, The Quest for Self-Determination 6-9 (1979).
131. Declaration on the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, Dec.
14, 1960, G.A. Res. 1514 (XV), 15 U.N. GAOR Supp. 16, at 66, para. 1, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1961). The International Court of'Justicerecognized the right to self-determination as the basis
for the process of decolonization in Legal Consequences for States of the Continued Presence
of South Africa in Namibia (South West Africa) Notwithstanding Security Council Resolution
276, 1971 I.CJ. 16, 31; The Western Sahara Case, 1975 I.CJ. 12, 31-32. See also U.N. Study
on Self-Determination, supra note 128, at 21-24.
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Africa,132 "democratic reforms" throughout the world,133 as well as the
reform of political institutions that impede the capacities of indigenous
peoples to develop freely.
In the decolonization context, the international community conceived of
self-determination as the right of the inhabitants of colonized territories to
achieve a condition of self-government and equality through "(a) [e]mer-
gence as a sovereign independent State; (b) [f]ree association with an
independent State; or (c) [i]ntegration with an independent State." 134 In most
cases, relevant actors deemed circumstances to warrant the transformation
of colonial territories into independent states. Prominent among the deter-
mining circumstances, although not the only factor, was the apparent or
expressed desire of the majority of the people within the colonial territorial
unit. 135 Historical and geographic factors also came into play.1 36 In all cases,
however, the goal was to remove the colonial structures of government in
which the colonized were, by definition, not full and equal participants.
37
Contemporaneous with the early periods of the decolonization movement,
previously existing and newly emergent states held out assimilation and
rights of full citizenship as means of bringing enclave indigenous peoples
132. See International Convention on the Suppression and Punishment of the crime of
"Apartheid", G.A. Res. 3068 (XXVII), 28 U.N. GAOR. Supp. No. 30, at 75, U.N. Doc A/9030
(1974) (entered into force July 18 1976); see also Paul G. Lauren, Power and Prejudice: The
Politics and Diplomacy of Racial Discrimination 240 (1988).
133. See generally Reisman, supra note 14, (discussing "self-determination" in association
with the spread of the idea of government by the "will of the people" as evidenced by recent
world events). The core idea of self-determination as described here is prominent in the political
rhetoric of western leaders in reflecting upon the downfall of communist regimes. See, e.g.,
U.S., Europe Cut Aid to Haiti: Bush Seeks Ousted Leader's Return, Chi. Trib., Oct. 2, 1991, at
4C (President Bush condemns military coup in Haiti and pledges to try to restore ousted
democratically elected President Jean-Bertrand Aristide); Between Thatcher andBush, Remark-
able Common Ground, Wash. Times, Sept. 29, 1991, at B2 (in reflecting upon the fall of
communism and the responsibility of the West to aid the emerging democracies, Mrs. Thatcher
stated that communism was opposed "not simply by an alliance of free peoples-though
certainly by that-but by the ideas of liberty, free enterprise, private property and democracy.").
134. Principles Which Should Guide Members In Determining Whether Or Not An
Obligation Exists To Transmit The Information Called For In Article 73(e) of the Charter of the
United Nations, Dec. 15, 1960, G.A. Res. 1541 (XV), principle VI. See Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra
note 129, at 115-28 (concluding that G.A. Res. 1541 is generally reflective of international
practice in the application of the principle of self-determination to the colonial territories).
135. Where the process of decolonization came under the auspices of the U.N. General
Assembly, the apparent or expressed goals of a "National Liberation Movement" frequently
substituted for a referendum. Michla Pomerance, Self-Determination in Law and Practice 35-36
(1982) (criticizing the U.N. practice of giving preference to national liberation movements).
136. Historical and geographical factors, for example, led to the incorporation of the small
territory of Ifni into Morocco, without a referendum for the people of Ifni. See Rigo-Sureda,
supra note 130, at 176, 198. In most all cases, historical and geographic factors alone establish
the self-determining unit.
137. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note 129, at 125-26.
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within the fold of self-government and equality. 138 ILO Convention No. 107
of 1957 reflected the prevailing policy. 139 The ideal paradigm was that of
the culturally homogenous independent nation-state.
As the international community has come to value the integrity of indige-
nous cultures, there has emerged a new norm of self-determination which
breaks from the dominant decolonization era paradigm. New thinking on the
requirements of modem governmental institutions as they relate to indige-
nous peoples was advanced by the OAS Inter-American Commission on
Human Rights in the case referred to above involving the Miskito Indians of
Nicaragua. In responding to the Indians' demands for political autonomy,
the Commission found that they were not beneficiaries of the right of
self-determination as the right was understood under the law of decoloniza-
tion.14° However, the Commission defied its own formalism and found that
notions of cultural integrity required a reconstituted political order for the
Indians. 141 The Commission further held that "[s]uch an institutional organi-
zation can only effectively carry out its assigned purposes to the extent it is
designed in the context of broad consultation, and carried out with the direct
participation of the ethnic minorities of Nicaragua, through their freely
chosen representatives."'
142
Although perhaps unwittingly, the Commission in the Miskito case indi-
cated how, for indigenous peoples, the notion of cultural integrity, like
freedom and equality, is bound up with the principle of self-determination.
If indigenous cultures are not valued, neither are their customs, and historical
institutions of self-government are either mere relics of the past, or at best,
mechanisms through which to assimilate indigenous cultures into the domi-
nant one. Under such a perceptual gloss, the idea of self-determination may
be considered satisfied by the simple inclusion of indigenous individuals as
full participants within social and political systems that are based on Western
liberal notions of democracy or popular sovereignty (or, until recently,
Marxist proletarianism). But once indigenous cultural groupings are ac-
knowledged and valued, as in the Miskito case, their defining characteristics
and community aspirations become factors that must be reflected in the
governing institutional order if self-determination notions are to prevail.
Following the Commission's decision, the Nicaraguan government en-
tered into negotiations with Indian leaders and eventually developed a
138. During the early decolonization period the policy of the United States was to
"terminate" federal recognition of Indian tribes and to assimilate them into the dominant society.
Other states with diverse indigenous populations, particularly newly independent states, were
similarly preoccupied with "nation-building", a euphemism for policies of breaking down tribal
bonds and customs in favor of assimilation.
139. See supra notes 22-27 and accompanying text.
140. OAS Miskito Indians Report, supra note 76, at 78-81.
141. Id. at 81-82.
142. Id. at 82.
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constitutional and legislative regime of political and administrative auton-
omy for the Indian populated Atlantic Coast region of the country.1 43 The
Nicaraguan government promoted the regime internationally as affirming the
Atlantic Coast indigenous groups' self-determination.
144
The developments concerning the Nicaraguan Indians mark a worldwide
trend. During the ILO and U.N. Working Group procedures numerous states
have reported use of constitutional, legislative and other official measures to
reorder governing institutional matrixes in response to indigenous peoples'
demands. The indicated trend is toward securing for indigenous groups
spheres of autonomy over a range of policy and administrative matters, while
at the same time ensuring their effective participation in all decisions affect-
ing them in matters left to the larger institutions of government. 145 The
143. See Robert N. Clinton et al., American Indian Law: Cases and Materials 1252-53 (3d
ed. 199 1); see generally Theodore Macdonald, The Moral Economy of the Miskito Indians: Local
Roots of a Geopolitical Conflict, in Ethnicities and Nations: Processes of Inter-Ethnic Relations
in Latin America, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific 107 (Remo Guidieiri et al. eds., 1988).
144. For example, the Nicaraguan Sandinista government reported on its new autonomy
regime to the United Nations Working Group at its 1988 session. The autonomy regime has
been much criticized by a Nicaraguan Indian Organization, YATAMA, as well as by intema-
tional advocacy groups, for not sufficiently meeting Indian aspirations. Nonetheless, the
Nicaraguan autonomy statute remains indicative of an important trend in governmental policy
and treatment of indigenous peoples.
145. See, e.g., 1991 Statement of the Government of Colombia to the Working Group,
supra note 91 (reporting on the newly adopted Colombian Constitution which. establishes
indigenous territories as among the territorial entities that form part of the political-administra-
tive subdivision of the country and thus enables Indians to exercise jurisdictional functions in
accordance with their own procedures and norms as long as they are not contrary to the
constitution and laws of the country); 1991 Information submitted by Colombia, supra note 61,
at 4-5 (outlining Colombian government steps taken to afford indigenous groups "the necessary
conditions to organize themselves in accordance with their own usages and customs and to
strengthen indigenous participation in decision-making on policies and programs affecting
them"); 1991 Statement of the Government of Canada to the Working Group, supra note 98, at
4-5 (government program by which the country's "first nations... can negotiate self-government
through new legislative arrangements that reflect more closely their particular circumstances"
and open discussions involving indigenous representatives "leading toward the constitutional
entrenchment of aboriginal self-government"); July 31, 1991 Statement of the Government of
Australia to the Working Group, supra note 93, at 1-2 ("consolidation of the Aboriginal and
Torres Strait Islander Commission", described as "a significant step toward aboriginal self-de-
termination and self-management"); July 29, 1991 Statement by Lois O'Donoghue, Chairperson
of the Aboriginal and Torres Strait Islander Commission in Australia (on file with author)
(describing the government-sponsored Commission scheme under which national elections were
held for aboriginal regional councils whose major responsibilities are to develop regional plans
and budgets, to set regional priorities, and to represent aboriginal and islander residents of the
region and advocate their interests); 1989 Statement of the Government of the Philippines to the
Working Group, supra note 122, at 2-3 (constitutional and legislative measures for the creation
of autonomous regions in the Muslin Mindanao and the Cordilleras, characterized as "the
granting of autonomy to indigenous populations"); 1989 Statement by the Government of
Norway to the Working Group, supra note 91, at 2 (1987 legislation concerning the estab-
lishment of a "Sami assembly" which will "comprise all matters affecting the Sami people in
Norway, and will be elected by direct elections").
After a campaign of criticism against the government of Bangladesh concerning its
treatment of the tribal peoples in the Chittagong Hill Tracts, the government of Bangladesh
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measures to enhance capacities of self-government vary from case to case.
However, states invariably have characterized these measures as resulting
from negotiations or meaningful consultations with the indigenous peoples
concerned and appropriate to their particular needs and characteristics.
Notwithstanding the prevailing attitudes, states have resisted an express
association of the term "self-determination" with indigenous peoples in
standard-setting exercises in the U.N. and LO. That resistance often has
taken the form of objection to use of the term "peoples" to refer to indigenous
communities, given that in a number of international instruments "all peoples
have the right to self-determination." 146 The rhetorical sensitivity, however,
does not entail an aversion to extending self-determination's conceptual core
in favor of indigenous peoples. Rather it is based on a concern that an
acknowledged "right to self-determination" for indigenous groups may
imply an effective right of secession. Thus, for example, in commenting on
the Working Group chair's first revised draft declaration on indigenous
rights, Canada remarked:
reported to the U.N. Working Group on legislation in that regard. U.N.Doc.
EICN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1989/2/Add.I (1989), at 2-5 (information submitted by Bangladesh). The
government reported that the legislation sets up three "local elected and autonomous government
councils ... with adequate power for the tribal power to run their own affairs and preserve their
socio-cultural heritage and separate identity." Id.
See also 1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/2. The Government of the
Soviet Union informed the Committee that drafted ILO Convention No. 169 that "associations
of indigenous peoples would be set up to improve the legal status of autonomous groups." Id.
"The government member of Honduras drew the Committee's attention to a new law precluding
state interference in matters within the competence of indigenous peoples, which was drafter
[sic] following extensive consultations with their representatives." Id.
146. See supra note 126 and 127 and accompanying text. Controversy over the term
"peoples" came to a head at the 1989 International Labour Conference which adopted Conven-
tion No. 169. Worker delegates pressed the position of indigenous observers in favor of the term
"peoples" against staunch opposition by government delegates. See 1989 ILO Provisional
Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/6 to 25/8. In the end, a compromise was reached which allowed
use of the term "peoples" in the revised Convention, but with the following provision added to
the text:
The use of the term "peoples" in this convention shall not be construed as having
any implications as regards to the rights which may attach to the term under
international law.
ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, art. 1(3). Furthermore, it was agreed that the following
appear in the record of the proceedings:
It is understood by the Committee that the use of the term "peoples" in this
Convention has no implications as regards the right to self-determination as
understood in international law.
1989 ILO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 27/7 para. 31. The International Labour
Office has taken the position that the qualifying language regarding use of the term "peoples"
"did not limit the meaning of the term, in any way whatsoever" but rather was a means of
deferring a decision on the legal implications of the term to procedures within the United Nations.
1989 Statement of International Labour Office to the Working Group (presented by Lee
Swepston) (on file with author).
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[Tihe use of the term "indigenous peoples" in lieu of "indigenous
populations", may have implications regarding rights to self-determi-
nation in international law that would be unacceptable to many states
if it meant that their indigenous populations were to have rights of
self-determination similar to those of sovereign nation-states. Clarifi-
cation of these terms need not, of course, preclude indigenous popula-
tions' rights or aspirations to greater autonomy or self-government, in
line with current and potential domestic legal provisions.
147
The concerns raised by Canada are exacerbated by an unfortunate strain
of political rhetoric that tends to equate self-determination with the idea that
"peoples" of some limited denomination have an absolute right to choose
whatever degree of "sovereignty" they wish, up to and including independent
statehood. Even in the decolonization context, the "peoples" concerned-
which were defined primarily by the colonial boundaries drawn without
regard to historical patterns of group identity-were not always accorded a
choice of independent statehood. 148 The absolutist view of self-determina-
tion moreover, misses the principle's essential thrust, which is not fundamen-
tally about exercising a one-shot choice for some degree of "sovereignty"
but, rather, is about securing for individuals and groups a political order that
promotes aperpetual condition of freedom. 149 In the decolonization context,
independent statehood was not as much an end as it was a means for achieving
conditions of human dignity. To be sure, a self-determining condition can
hardly exist if government structures are imposed upon a politically con-
scious group without genuine regard for the group's aspirations. But in
today's world of complex interdependencies, little room exists for absolute
choices, even for recognized states.
Despite aversion to the term self-determination, states have been able to
agree on normative language commensurate with self-determination's juris-
prudential core. As already stressed, Convention No. 169 generally affirms
147. U.N. Doe. E/CN.41Sub.21AC.4/l990/lIAdd.3, at 2; see also 1990 Statement of the
Government of India to the Working Group (presented by Prabhu Dayal) (on file with author).
While affirming that the "Government of India has been conscious of the fact that the scheduled
tribes should be allowed to develop according to their own ideas and goals", the delegate from
India objected to the use of the term self-determination on the ground that the "rights to
self-determination includes the right to cessation [sic: secession] and to form a separate political
entity." Id. at 6, 8.
148. Thus for example, the population of British Togoland was asked to decide between
integration with the Gold Coast and continuing the status quo; and in referenda held in the
Northern and Southern British Cameroons the choice was between joining with Nigeria or the
Republic of Cameroon. Rigo-Sureda, supra note 130, at 163-68 (1973).
149. In his insightful study on the international law and practice of self-determination,
Ofuatey-Kodjoe concludes that "self-determination is not an act or process. During the
inter-war period, it was a principle that could be applied in order that a group may achieve a
condition of equality, and in the decolonization, it has become a right by which a group may
attain equality and full self-government" through various options. Ofuatey-Kodjoe, supra note
129, at 161.
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that states are to allow indigenous peoples, as groups, meaningful choices in
all matters affecting them. Specifically, Convention No. 169 requires "spe-
cial measures" to safeguard indigenous "persons, institutions, property,
labor, cultures and environment" and requires that the measures be consistent
with "the freely-expressed wishes of the peoples concerned."15 Also, the
Convention mandates effective means by which indigenous peoples "can
freely participate ... at all levels of decision-making" affecting them;'
5 '
requires governments to promote indigenous peoples "own institutions and
initiatives"; 152 requires that consultations with indigenous peoples "be un-
dertaken, in good faith ... with the objective of achieving agreement or
consent"1 53 and affirms the right of indigenous peoples "to decide their own
priorities for the process of development as it affects their lives, beliefs,
institutions and spiritual well-being and the lands they occupy or otherwise
use." 154 The Convention also upholds the right of indigenous peoples to
"retain their own customs and institutions" 155 and requires that "the methods
customarily practiced by the people concerned for dealing with offenses
committed by their members shall be respected."'
56
Government practice in discussing the proposed indigenous rights decla-
ration within the U.N. Working Group has affirmed the foregoing prescrip-
tions. But governments have generally withheld approval of proposed
language affirming a "right of autonomy" over "internal and local affairs."1
57
Governments have raised fears that such a right expressed in abstract terms
without greater clarification might be interpreted as allowing indigenous
communities to displace state laws unilaterally, or as promoting a kind of
isolation of indigenous peoples that might be inappropriate to many situ-
ations.' 58 However, a consensus among states at least to the extent of the
prescriptions set forth in Convention No. 169 is apparent, particularly by the
150. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, art. 4.
151. Id. art. 6.1(b).
152. Id. art. 6.1(c).
153. Id. art. 6.2. Inclusion of the terms "agreement" and "consent" was controversial
because some governments believed that the words might be construed to imply an effective
veto power on the part of indigenous groups. During the negotiation of the text, Argentina and
Bolivia proposed language that would "ensure effective participation of [indigenous] peoples in
decisions which affected them" while avoiding use of the disputed words. 1989 ILO Provisional
Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/11 para. 73. Other states that expressed support for the proposed
alternative language were Ecuador, Brazil, India and Venezuela. Id. States that expressed
support for the language as ultimately adopted included Australia, Denmark, Portugal, United
States and U.S.S.R. Id. at 25/12, para. 73. The proposed alternative language was put to a vote
in the committee and narrowly rejected. Id. at 25/12, para. 74.
154. ILO Convention No. 169, supra note 21, art. 7(1).
155. Id. art. 8(2).
156. Id. art. 9(1).
157. First Revised Text of the Draft Universal Declaration on the Rights of Indigenous
Peoples, supra note 43, art. 23.
158. See 1990 Working Group Analytical Commentary, supra note 55, at 17-18.
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governmentreports on domestic reforms that are in line with and even surpass
those prescriptions.
159
Since the time Convention No. 169 was developed, the U.N. Working
Group has promoted a dialogue on express recognition of the right of
indigenous peoples to self-determination, in a spirit of moving beyond
absolutist notions of the concept and matching it with contemporary realities.
Within the Group's deliberations, an increasing number of states have
encouraged express reference to self-determination in the proposed U.N.
indigenous rights declaration. In 1989 Australia had joined other states in
expressing concern over the usage of the term "peoples" because of its
association with the term sef-determination. 16° In a statement to the Work-
ing Group at its 1991 session, however, the Australian delegation expressed
"hope" that
it would be possible to find ways to refer to self-determination in the
draft declaration which will meet the concerns of all.
Events in all parts of the World show us that the concept of self-deter-
mination must be considered broadly, that is, not only as the attainment
of national independence. Peoples are seeking to assert their identities,
to preserve their languages, cultures, and traditions and to achieve
greater autonomy and self-management, free from undue interference
from central governments.
161
Other states that have indicated some support for invoking the term
self-determination in standard setting exercises concerning indigenous peo-
159. See supra notes 59, 62; see also 1991 Statement of the Government of New Zealand
to the Working Group, supra note 90, at 4 (while expressing difficulty with the proposed
language concerning a "right to autonomy", New Zealand supports the concept of enhanced
respect for indigenous laws, customs and practices). Argentina has proposed language affirming
the right of indigenous peoples "to have their specific character duly reflected in the political
system and in the soio-economic institutions, including and in particular proper regard to and
recognition of indigenous customs." 1991 Revised Working Paper, supra note 55, at 89. Further,
while expressing difficulty with the term "self-determination", Argentina stated that it does not
oppose the basic concept that indigenous communities should have the freedom to administer
their own affairs to the greatest extent possible. U.N. Doc. E/CN.4/Sub.2/AC.4/1990/1, supra
note 55, at4 para. 9; Mexico similarly has expressed concern over the art. 23 "right to autonomy"
while affirming the right of indigenous peoples to have control over their own affairs. U.N. Doc.
E/CN.41Sub.2/AC.4/1991/1, at 6-7.
160. 1989 Working Group Analytical Compilation of Observations, supra note 55, Add.l
at 3.
161. July 24, 1991 Australian Government Delegation Speaking Notes on Self-Determi-
nation, at 2 (on file with author).
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ples include Papua New Guinea, 162 Mexico, 63 New Zealand,' 64 Iran'65 and
Ukraine.
166
Whether or not by express reference to the term, an international consen-
sus supports a norm concerning indigenous peoples which extends from
self-determination's jurisprudential core. A preponderance of states and
other relevant actors now accepts that indigenous peoples have the right to
exist as distinct cultural communities and develop freely as such in all spheres
of life, to live within a governing institutional order that reflects their specific
characteristics, and to be genuinely associated with all decisions affecting
them.
VI. CONCLUSION
The emergence of a new body of international law specifically concerned
with indigenous peoples is a milestone in their centuries-long quest for
survival. Although in somewhat modest form, ILO Convention No. 169
stands as an express affirmation of the burgeoning commitment by the world
community to secure a future in which indigenous communities may retain
their unique characteristics and develop freely in co-existence with all of
humankind. The Convention corresponds with a still developing body of
customary norms upholding rights to indigenous cultural integrity, lands and
resources, and self-determination.
The new indigenous rights norms are grounds upon which indigenous
peoples may appeal to decisionmakers within the international human
rights program. 167 The norms may even be invoked in purely domestic
adjudicative settings. In many countries, as in the United States, domestic
tribunals may invoke international treaty and customary norms as rules of
162. Papua New Guinea proposed language for the proposed Universal Declaration that
would affirm "the right to self-determination." U.N. Doc. E/CN4ISub.2/AC.4/1990/I, at 12
(1990).
163. In commenting on proposals for the new ILO Convention No. 169, Mexico stated that
the Convention should reflect respect for political and economic self-determination for indige-
nous communities. ILO Convention (No. 107), Report VI(2), supra note 90, at 7-8.
164. During the 1990 Session of the U.N. Working Group, the government of New Zealand
sought to "put the record straight" to rebut any inference that it was not willing to recognize the
"right to self-determination" of the indigenous Maori. 1990 Supplemental Statement by the
Government of New Zealand to the Working Group (on file with author).
165. During the negotiation of Convention No. 169, Iran stated that the new Convention
"should not neglect the rights of the indigenous peoples of the world to land and self-determi-
nation." 1989 LO Provisional Record 25, supra note 48, at 25/4 para. 14.
166. 1989 Working Group Analytical Compilation of Observations, supra note 55 Add.3,
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